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I.

Argentina*

A.

MERGERS

1. Abrasivos
On October 21, 2008, the Secretary of Domestic Trade authorized Brazilian-based
Saint-Gobain Abrasivos Ltda. (SG) to acquire 100 percent of the shares of Abrasivos
* The contribution for Argentina was written by Maria Josd Rodriguez Macias and Alfredo Rovira of
Brons & Salas Abogados.
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Argentinos S.A. (AA).' Both companies produce and market abrasive products, with SG
concentrating on solid abrasives like discs and stones and AA concentrating on flexible
products like sandpaper. Following the acquisition, the merged party would hold a
59.46% share of sales. AA accounts for ninety-five percent of domestic production; and
consumer loyalty creates significant barriers to entry.
The Argentine Antitrust Commission (AAC) expressed concerns about the impact of
the transaction and required the purchaser to divest selected assets and trademarks.

2. Alpargatas
On October 23, 2008, the Secretary of Domestic Trade authorized Sao Pablo Alpargatas S.A.'s to acquire control of Alpargatas S.A. through the purchase of 34.4994% of the
latter's outstanding shares.2 The two companies manufacture work apparel and other
products.
The AAC found that the two companies are close competitors (#1 and #2) and would
have had a 43.28% post-merger market share. Accordingly, the AAC required the merged
entity to assign the high-end "Pampero" trademark and related assets to a competitor.

B.

COURT DECISIONS

On April 16, 2008, the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice (the CSJN) ruled that the
AAC and the Secretary of Domestic Trade are the competent authorities to enforce Antitrust Law No. 25,156, until the Argentine Antitrust Tribunal (Tribunal Nacional de
Defensa de la Competencia) is created pursuant to that law. 3 The CSJN confirmed that
the AAC should hear cases and investigate and prepare opinions, while the Secretary of
Domestic Trade should issue the final Resolution. The ruling reversed the judgment of
the Argentine Court of Appeals in Civil and Commercial Matters, which had held that the
AAC, as the entity created by the repealed Law No. 22,262, should investigate and decide
the cases submitted to it for consideration, independently of the Secretary of Domestic
Trade.

1. Comision Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia, Expte. No. S01:0098017/2007 (Conc. No. 625)
DP/EA-DG-MPM, "SAINT-GOBAIN ABRAS1VOS y SR. DAVISON S/ NOTIFICACION ART. 8 LEY
25.156 (Conc. 625)," available at http://www.cndc.gov.ar/dictamenes/saint_gobain-abrasivosa-argentinos.pdf.
2. Comision Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia, Expte. No. S01:0401242/2007 (Conc. No. 658)
DP/VDV-DO-WB-YDC-JP-MA, "SAO PABLO ALPARGATAS S.A. Y OTROS S/ NOTIFICACION ARTICULO 8 LEY No. 25,156 (Conc. 256)," available at http://www.cndc.gov.ar/dictamenes/sao-pauloalpargatas-alaprgatas.argentina.pdf.
3. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] [Supreme Court], 16/4/2008, "Belmonte, Manuel and Asociaci6n
Ruralista General Alvear v. Estado Nnacional - Poder Ejecutivo Nacional - Ministerio de Economia y
Produccion - Secretaria de Ccoodinacion Tecnica - Comision Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia /
FAL," http://www.csjn.gov.ar/documentos/cfal3/cons fallos.jsp (enter Docket No. "B. 1626. XLII" in "No.
de expediente" field and decision date "16/4/2008" in "Fecha de resoluci6n" field).
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II. Australia*
A.

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

On October 27, 2008, the Federal government released the "final" exposure draft of its
legislation to criminalize cartel conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the
TPA), the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Bill 2008
(the Bill). 4 The Bill also creates a parallel civil prohibition that replicates the criminal
offense. Subject to consultation with the states and territories, the government intends to
introduce the Bill into Parliament in late 2008. If passed, the Bill is likely to come into
effect in early 2009.

The Bill specifies that the relevant fault element to be applied to the criminal cartel
offense is "knowledge or belief." That is, did the defendant know or believe that the
relevant contract, arrangement, or understanding contained a cartel provision?
Contravention of the criminal cartel offense can entail fines of up to AUD$220,000
(approximately US$140,000) and imprisonment for up to ten years 5 for individuals and
fines for corporations up to the greater of (i) AUD$10 million (approximately US$6.4
million), (ii) three times the value of the benefit attributable to the cartel as a whole, or
(iii) where the value cannot be determined, 10 percent of the corporation's annual turnover. Contravention of the civil cartel prohibition will carry the same corporate fines and
fines up to AUD$500,000 (approximately US$320,000) for individuals.
The Federal government also introduced legislation on June 26, 2008 to clarify and
6
strengthen provisions in the TPA relating to misuse of market power.
Finally, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) released its
revised merger guidelines for public comment on February 8, 2008. 7 The revised guidelines seek to modernize existing guidelines dating from 1999 by adopting the key theoretical frameworks developed in Europe and the United States.
B.

CARTELS

Several significant fines were agreed to and ordered against participants in price fixing
cartels, including in the supply of: corrugated fibreboard packaging (AUD$36 million/
approximately US$23 million), 8 international air cargo services (AUD$2 5 million/approx* The contribution for Australia was written by Paul Schoff of the Sydney office of Minter Ellison.
4. Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Bill 2008-Exposure Draft, available
The release of the Bill folat http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?Navld=006&ContenlD=1426.
lows the release of an initial exposure bill by the Federal government in February 2008. The initial exposure

bill was accompanied by a brief discussion paper issued by the government and a draft memorandum of
understanding between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Commonwealth Di-

rector of Public Prosecutions to facilitate arrangements between them. Submissions on this initial exposure
bill were sought as part of the Government's consultation process.
5. This is an increase from the five-year maximum term of imprisonment imposed in the initial exposure
bill.
6. Trade Practices Amendment, supra note 4.
7. See AuSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION, MERGER GUIDELINES DRAr (2008),

available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/776536.
8. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n v. Visy Indus. Holdings Proprietary Ltd. (No. 3)
[2007] FCA 1617, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCA/2007/1617.html.
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imately US$16 million),9 wood preservatives (AUD$2.5 million/approximately US$1.6
million),10 and educational services (AUD$125,000/approximately US$80,000)." The
ACCC also commenced criminal proceedings against a person for allegedly providing
false or misleading evidence during its investigation into the corrugated fibreboard packaging cartel.12
C.

COURT DECISIONS

Following an epic court battle, the ACCC finally succeeded in securing a judgment
against Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (Baxter) for breaches of section 46 (misuse of market
power) and section 47 (exclusive dealing) of the TPA in relation to bundled offers in the
tender process for contracts entered into by Baxter and State government health purchasing authorities between 1998 and 2005.13
In March 2008, the High Court handed down its much-anticipated judgment on a constitutional challenge to parts of the telecommunication service access regime in the TPA. 14
The challenge was brought by Telstra, Australia's incumbent telephony provider, which
argued that the TPA provisions that allow the ACCC to set prices for compulsory third
party unbundled access to Telstra's copper wire network constitute a compulsory seizure
of its property "other than on just terms."' 5 In a unanimous judgment, the High Court
concluded that the legislative provisions for the exercise of access rights by other carriers
"effect no acquisition of Telstra's property in the local loops . ."16

I.
A.

Austria*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Unlike most European states, the decision-making power in Austrian antitrust and
merger cases rests with a specialized court (the Cartel Court), with the Federal Competition Authority (the FCA) being limited to an investigative role. A proposal by the Austrian Ministry of Economics to bring the Austrian system into line with the European
9. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n v. Qantas Airways Ltd. [2008] FCA 1976; Australian
Competition and Consumer Comm'n v. British Airways PLC, [20081 FCA 1977.
10. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. FChem (Austl.) Ltd. [2008] FCA 344, available at
http://www.ausdii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCA/2008/344.htm].
11. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. Kokos Int'l Proprietary Ltd. (No 2) [2008] FCA 5,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCA/2008/5.html.
12. The ACCC has commenced criminal prosecution against Richard Pratt for allegedly providing false or
misleading evidence in the course of an ACCC investigation. See Press Release, Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), ACCC begins criminal prosecution against Richard Pratt for allegedly providing false or misleading evidence (une 20, 2008), availableathttp://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/
itemId/832393/fromItemld/631281.
13. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n v. Baxter Healthcare Proprietary Ltd. [20081 FCAFC
141, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2008/141.html.
14. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (2008) 234 C.L.R. 210, available at http://www.austlii.edu.
au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2008/7.html.
15. Id.
16. Id.

* The contribution for Austria was written by Dr. Axel Reidlinger and Dr. Heinrich Kiihnert of
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Vienna.
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model by granting the FCA decision-making power failed to gain sufficient political support in 2008.17
B.

MERGERS

As of October 31, 2008, 233 merger filings had been submitted to the FCA in 2008,
with eight going to Phase H review.18
The only substantive merger decision by the Cartel Court in 2008 related to a transaction between two Austrian press companies that contributed their respective regional free
newspapers to a joint venture. 19 The transaction did not result in any significant geographic market overlaps. The proceedings therefore mainly focused on the proposed joint
venture's conglomerate effects, i.e., whether the combination of the companies' portfolios
of regional free weeklies would disadvantage competitors that operate in only one region.
The Cartel Court's investigation revealed that this was unlikely to happen. The Cartel
Court also found that the efficiencies resulting from the combination would make the
joint venture more competitive for national advertising campaigns, which, for the most
part, can only currently be placed in a single national newspaper, the Kronen Zeitung.
The FCA has appealed the Cartel Court's decision, alleging various substantive and pro20
cedural errors.
C.

CARTELS

In October 2008, the Supreme Court confirmed the Cartel Court's record fine of C75.4
million (approximately US $96 million) imposed in 2007 against a cartel in the elevators
and escalators market. 21 The Supreme Court ruled that the Cartel Court was correct in
focusing on an "overall cartel" which did not have to be broken up into single violations
(of which some could have benefited from the statute of limitations). The Supreme Court
also explicitly approved the Cartel Court's method for setting fines, which is consistent
with the European Commission's 2006 guidelines.
The Supreme Court also affirmed the Cartel Court's decision in a related civil damages
case. 22 As Austrian civil procedure does not provide for pre-trial discovery, private litigants may find it difficult to prove that they suffered damage as a consequence of a cartel.
17. Wettbewerbsbehtrdenreorganisationsgesetz 2008 [Competition Authorities Reorganization Act 2008

(Draft)], 224/ME (XXII. GP) (Austria), available at http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXItIME/
ME_00224/pmh.shtml.
18. See FCA website, http://www.bwb.gv.at/.
19. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 17, 2008, Docket No. 160kl 5/08 (Austria), available at http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at/Jus/ (check only the "Entscheidungstexte (TE)" box and enter "160k1 5/08"
in Geschiftszahl field).
20. See Merger Notification, Federal Competition Authority (FCA), BWB/Z-671 - Styria Medien AG;
Moser Holding AG (Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.bwb.gv.at/BWB/Veroeffenthchmgen/Zusammenschluesse/Zusammenschluesse 2008/z 0671.htm.
21. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Oct. 8, 2008, Docket No. 160k5/08 (Austria), available
at http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at/jus/ (check only the "Entscheidungstexte (TE)" box and enter "160k5/08" in
Gesch~ftszahl field).
22. Oberster Gerichtshof 1OGH] [Supreme Court] Oct. 8, 2008, Docket No. 160k8/08 (Austria), available
at http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at/jus/ (check only the "Entscheidungstexte (TE)" box and enter "160k8/08" in the
"Gesch~iftszahl" field).
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In an attempt to overcome this problem, a number of customers allegedly affected by the
elevatorsand escalators cartel brought an application in the Cartel Court for a declaratory
judgment against the cartel participants. The Supreme Court upheld the Cartel Court's
dismissal of the application, on the grounds that the Cartel Court does not have the jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments merely for the purpose of supporting a private damages claim.
D.

ANTICOMPETrvE PRACTICES

As of the writing of this article, there was only one decision in 2008 requiring an undertaking to cease abusing its dominant position.2 3 That case involved a vertically-integrated
film distributor/theatre operator that was ordered to provide a local theatre operator with
a copy of the film "Asterix at the Olympic Games" because of its revenue-earning potential. The Court granted the order even though the distributor only had a ten percent
share of the film distribution market in Austria, based on the likely "grave harm" to the
theatre operator's business if it did not get the film.
In aJuly 2008 decision, the Supreme Court held that the provision prohibiting discrimination against "resellers" in the Act on Local Supplies also extends to companies that
process goods prior to their "resale" (such as sawmills), and not just to the resale of goods
at retail. Although the Act on Local Supplies applies to non-dominant parties, a similar
provision in the Austrian Competition Act prohibits dominant parties from discriminating
against "resellers." As a result, the prohibition against discrimination may now be broad
enough to apply to any wholesale supplier of goods, dominant or not, irrespective of
24
whether its customers process the goods purchased prior to resale.
IV.
A.

Belgiumi*
CARTELS

The Belgium Competition Council issued three important cartel decisions in 2008,
consistent with its objective of spending less time on merger review and more resources
25
on cartel enforcement.
23. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] (Supreme Court] July 16, 2008, Docket No. 160k6/08 (Austria), available at http://www.ris2.bka.gv.atljus/ (check only the "Entscheidungstexte (TE)" box and enter "160k6/08" in
the "Geschgftszahl" field).
24. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] July 16, 2008, Docket No. 160k3/08 (Austria), available at http://www.ris2.bka.gv.at/Jus/ (check only the "Entscheidungstexte (TE)" box and enter "160k3/08" in
the "Geschaftszahl" field).
* The contribution for Belgium was written by Thibault Balthazar and Bruno Lebrun of Lathan &
Watkins LLP, Brussels.
25. This objective has been furthered by the increase in jurisdictional thresholds for merger control review
in the new Competition Act of 2006, and by introducing a "simplified procedure" handled exclusively by the
Auditors and not by the Council. See Act of September 15, 2006 for the Protection of Economic Competition, MONrTEUR BELGE [Belgian Gazette], Sept. 29, 2006, available at http://mineco.fgov.be/organization-market/competition/pdfZRD-31102006_copies.pdf. The simplified procedure was revised on June 8,
2007 and allows parties, if certain conditions are satisfied, to file a much less detailed information form.
Under certain conditions, the Auditor will confirm in a letter within twenty working days that the concentration does not raise competition concerns. This letter has the value of a decision of the Competition Council.
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On January 25, 2008, the Council imposed its first cartel fine under the new Competition Act of 2006 against VEBIC, the Flemish bakers' trade association.2 6 VEBIC was
fined a total of C29,000 (APPROXIMATELY US$38,000)27 for having created and sent to its
members a detailed cost scheme and bread price index, which induced the bakers to increase their prices. In its decision, the Council acknowledged that a trade association may
provide information to its members to help them better assess their own cost structures
and independently determine their selling prices. But the Council found that the system
that VEBIC had established was designed to induce its members to increase their prices.
The VEBIC case represents the first time that the Council has imposed a fine on an association of undertakings, which it is now authorized to do under the new Competition Act of
2006.
On July 7, 2008, the Council fined another association, the Belgian Federation of Professional Driving Schools (FAB), for issuing recommendations designed to induce members to increase their prices.28 The Council stated that a trade association may inform its
members of market evolution and may provide members with advice to help them run
their businesses, as long as the association does not, directly or indirectly, seek to restrict
competition. The Council concluded that FAB intended not merely to inform its members but also to stimulate price increases and imposed a fine of C6,990 (approximately
US$9,000).

29

The third decision of note was rendered by the Council on April 4, 2008 in connection
with a cartel in the Belgian market for Butyl Benzyl Phthalate (BBP), a chemical substance
mainly used as a plasticizer for PVC.30 The Council found that Bayer, Ferro/Solutia and
Lonza had conspired to fix prices, allocate market shares and customers, and exchange
sensitive information. This decision is particularly important because it is the Council's
first decision following an immunity application and includes reductions of fine as a result
of leniency applications. 3' Bayer, which was the first to submit decisive evidence to the
Council, benefited from immunity. The others received reduced fines ranging from
£114,618 (approximately US$149,000) to C175,594 (approximately US$228,000).
This decision is also of particular relevance from a procedural point of view. The
Council clarified that fines imposed in Belgium should be based exclusively on the Belgian
It is interesting to note that only twenty concentrations were notified in 2007 whereas the Belgian competition authorities conducted fifteen dawn raids and seventeen investigations relating to suspected illegal cartel
conduct.
26. Decision No. 2008-1/0-04, Jan. 25, 2008 (Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en
Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers), available at http://economie.fgov.be/organizationmarket/competition/jurisprudence/042008io04_Vebicpub.pdf.
27. Based on Nov. 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of Cl = US$1.30.
28. Decision No. 2008-P/K-43, July 7, 2008 (ISC v. FAB and its members and Test-Achats v. driving
schools of Belgium), available at http://vlex.be/vid/concurrence-conc-isc-test-achats-40921323.
29. The low amount of the fine was explained by the particular circumstances of the case, notably the
length of the proceedings (almost ten years), FAB's cooperation and the significant decrease in FAB's membership over time (150 members in 1999 to 43 in 2008).
30. Decision No. 2008-4/0-13, Apr. 4, 2008 (BayerAG-Ferro (Belgium) SPRL - Lonza S.pA and Solutia Europe
S.A) available at http://economie.fgov.be/organization-market/competition/jurisprudence/1 320081 3-BayerFerroSolutia_Lonza.pdf.
31. It should be noted that this decision was rendered pursuant to the Council's 2004 Leniency Notice
rather than under the revised Leniency Notice adopted in October 2007.
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turnover of the companies concerned, regardless of whether the companies also are fined
for the same conduct in other jurisdictions.

V. Brazil*
A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Electronic filing of submissions to the Brazilian System of Competition Defense
(SBDC) is currently being tested.32 The form of the filing is still being debated, although
the Brazilian competition authorities aim to finalize it shortly. A bill to restructure the
SBDC is currently under consideration in the National Congress.3 3 It is expected to be
voted on in 2009.

B.

MERGERS

In 2008, Brazilian authorities required the unwinding of the Brazilian portion of Owens
Corning's acquisition of fiber glass strengtheners manufacturer Compagnie de Saint
Gobain. 34 This marked the first time in Brazilian antitrust history that an international
transaction was ordered to be unwound. The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) based its decision on: (i) the high market concentration in certain relevant
markets, (ii) the lack of installed capacity of competitors, (iii) the high barriers to entry,
(iv) the strong likelihood of collusion after the acquisition, and (v) the lack of efficiencies
resulting from the transaction. In order to comply with the decision, CADE ordered
Owens Corning to: (i) sell the business units acquired in Brazil; (ii) hire, on CADE's
approval, an independent company to evaluate the assets and conditions of payment; and
(iii) hire, on CADE's approval, an independent company to monitor the selling process
and identify potential purchasers.
Other notable transactions approved include the acquisition of VRG Linhas Areas
(VRG), a major Brazilian airline holding company, by GOL (GTI S.A.) (GOL), another
36
major airline company, 35 and Inbev's acquisition of Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.
* The contribution for Brazil was written by Mirio Nogueria, Ricardo Inglez de Souza, and Bruno
Drago of Demarest e Almeida. The authors would like to thank Stefanie Schmitt for her contribution in the
research for this article.
32. Ministerio da Justica, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica [CADE], Resolution No. 49 (July
23, 2008).
33. See Legislative Bill No. 3934/2004. This bill was initially proposed in 2004 and was re-introduced this
year by Congressman Ciro Gomes. The full text of the bill is available at http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/
PropDetalheasp?id=260383.
34. See Ministerio da Justica, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica [CADE], Concentration Act
No. 08012.001885/2007-11.
35. See Ministerio da Justica, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica [CADE], Concentration Act
No. 08012.003267/2007-14.
36. See Ministerio da Justica, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica [CADE], Concentration Act
No. 08012.008015/2008-54.
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CARTELS

Brazilian authorities announced intentions to move against international cartels that
may produce effects in Brazil. For example, SDE has affirmed in recent cases that it will
prosecute and impose fines on international companies and on their foreign managers
(i.e., foreign individuals). Another measure involves including the names of foreign individuals on Interpol lists.
An international cartel was at the center of the most discussed Brazilian competition law
event of 2008, i.e., the signing of a Commitment to Cease Practices Under Investigation
(TCC) by one of the parties under investigation in Brazil for being part of the international cartel of maritime hose manufacturers. 37 The signed TCC differed from ones typically employed as the party seeking leniency had already confessed its participation in and
the existence of the cartel and therefore could not benefit from full immunity. Instead, in
order to have the TCC signed, the applicant acknowledged its participation in the cartel,
paid a fine proportional to its participation (limited to the impact of the violation in Brazil) and committed itself to assist the authorities in the investigation.

VI.
A.

Canada*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPAIENTS

During Canada's October 2008 election, the Conservative party promised to introduce
several far-reaching changes to Canada's Competition Act (the Act), including:
" a new criminal conspiracy offense focused on "hard core" cartel conduct such as
price fixing and bid-rigging, with other types of potentially anticompetitive agreements to be dealt with on a separate non-criminal track;
* new maximum penalties for cartels and bid-rigging of CDN$25 million (approximately US$20.5 million) 38 in fines and fourteen years in prison (up from the current
maximum of CDN$10 million (approximately US$8.2 million) in fines and five
years imprisonment);
" new fines for abuse of dominance of up to CDN$10 million (approximately US$8.2
million) for initial offenders and CDN$15 million (approximately US$12.3 million)
for repeat offenders; and
* repeal of the Act's criminal offenses for price discrimination, promotional allowances, and predatory pricing.
The Conservatives received a plurality of seats in the House of Commons and were set
to form a minority government. As of the writing of this article, however, it is no longer
clear who will be forming the government because a coalition of three other parties is
threatening to vote against the Conservatives on a non-confidence motion. That said, the
above proposals to amend the Act have received support in the past from these other
37. See Ministerio da Justica, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica [CADE], Administrative Proceeding No. 08012.010932/2007-18.
* The contribution for Canada was written by Mark Katz and Jim Dinning of Davies Ward Phillips &
Vineberg LLP.
38. Based on the November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of CDN$1=US$0.82.
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parties, so the changes may eventually be enacted even if the Conservative minority government is defeated.
B.

MERGERS

Among its various investigative powers, the Competition Bureau is entitled to apply ex
parte to a judge for orders requiring the production of documents and other information.
The use of these orders has been controversial, with the business and legal communities
expressing concern over the Bureau's general unwillingness to consult with parties prior to
seeking such orders, and the tendency of such orders to be OVERBROAD and poorly
drafted.
On January 28, 2008, a Federal Court judge took the unusual step of setting aside two
Bureau production orders obtained in the course of a merger investigation on the grounds
that the Bureau's applications for the orders were "misleading, inaccurate and incomplete." 39 As a result of this criticism, the Minister of Industry ordered an investigation
into the Bureau's processes and procedures for obtaining production orders. The report
was publicly released on August 13, 2008.40 Although largely refraining from finding fault
with the Bureau, the report offered several helpful suggestions, including that the Bureau
should engage in pre-application dialogue with parties where feasible.
C.

CARTELS

Charges were laid in June 2008 against thirteen individuals and eleven companies accused of fixing gasoline prices in Quebec. 41 While many defendants have indicated their
intent to contest the charges vigorously, certain individuals and companies have pleaded
guilty and agreed to pay total fines exceeding CDN$2 million (approximately US$1.6
million). 42 One individual defendant pleaded guilty and agreed to be sentenced to twelve
months' imprisonment to be served in the community. 43 The Bureau used wiretaps as
part of its investigation.
In July 2008, the Bureau announced that two individuals had been extradited to the
United States for their role in a deceptive telemarketing scheme involving American consumers and had been found guilty and sentenced to a combined forty-two years in prison
by the U.S. Federal Court in the Southern District of Illinois. 44 This is the first time that
Canadian nationals have been extradited to a foreign jurisdiction for a competition-related
offense.
39. Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Labatt Brewing Co., [2008] FCA 22.
40. BIAN GOVER, REVIEW OF SECTION 11 OF THE COMPFETION AcT (2008), available at http://
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02709.html.
41. Press Release, Competition Bureau Canada, Competition Bureau Uncovers Gasoline Cartel in Quebec
(June 12, 2008), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02694.html.
42. Press Release, Competition Bureau Canada, Third Individual Pleads Guilty in Quebec Gasoline Cartel
Case (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02744.html.
43. Id.
44. Press Release, Competition Bureau Can., Canadian Scanmners Extradited to the U.S. Receive Lengthy
Prison Sentences (July 30, 2008), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/
02717e.html.
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On November 21, 2008, the Competition Bureau announced that Akzo Nobel Chemicals International BV had pleaded guilty to criminal charges for its role in an international
cartel to fix the price of hydrogen peroxide sold in Canada. Akzo agreed to pay a fine of
CDN $3.15 million (approximately US $2.6 million). This case is yet another example of
an international cartel investigation where the Bureau benefited from the co-operation of
an immunity applicant.
Finally, in April 2008, the Bureau released a Draft Information Bulletin on Sentencing
and Leniency in Cartel Cases (the Draft Bulletin).45 The Draft Bulletin sets out the Bureau's suggested approach for recommending sentences in cartel cases, including when it
will recommend that cartel participants that do not qualify for immunity may receive "lenient treatment" (i.e., a reduced penalty). A final version of the Bulletin should be released in 2009.

VII.
A.

Chile*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A bill to amend the Chilean Antitrust Law4 6 (DL 211) is expected to be enacted during
the first quarter of 2009. The bill has been the subject of discussion in the Chilean Congress since June 2006. One objective of the bill is to strengthen cartel enforcement,
mainly by affording greater investigative powers to the Antitrust Attorney and by increasing the independence and impartiality of the Antitrust Court and its members. 47 The bill
would grant the Antitrust Attorney new investigative powers, such as the power to access
private or government-owned areas, carry out dawn raids, intercept communications, and
obtain communication companies' records of transmitted or received communications.
The bill also contemplates the introduction of a leniency program and proposes an increase in the maximum fine for violations of DL 211 from approximately US$15 million
to approximately US$22 million.
B. MERGERS
In January 2008, the Antitrust Court approved, subject to conditions, the merger of two
private pension funds, AFP Santa Maria and Bansander AFP.4s The conditions required
that the merged entity: (i) establish and maintain for two years a uniform total commission regime to ensure that commissions would not be higher post-merger than premerger; and (ii) guarantee free and non-discriminatory access to any new competitor re45. Press Release, Competition Bureau Can., Draft Information Bulletin on Sentencing and Leniency in
Cartel Cases (Apr. 2008), availabk at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/02663e.
html.
* The contribution for Chile was written by Claudio Lizana, Marcos Rios, and Lorena Pavic of Carey y
Cfa. Abogados.
46. Law for the Defense of Free Competition, 1973, Decree Law No. 211, available at http://www.tdlc.cl
and http://www.fiie.cl.
47. Bill No. 4630/2006 (proposing to amend Decree Law No. 211 (1973), as modified by Law No. 19, 911
(2003)), available at http://www.bcn.cl.
48. AFP Santa Maria S.A.'s Voluntary Consultation regarding its merger with Bansander AFP S.A., NC
205-07 Res. No. 23/2008 (Jan. 4, 2008), availabk at www.tdlc.cl.
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quiring the services rendered by Previred, a private entity owned by the five Chilean pension funds that supports the payment of social security contributions through the Internet.
Also in January 2008, the Antitrust Court prohibited the merger between two leading
retail groups. 49 This marked the first time that the Antitrust Court had refused to approve a transaction submitted for consultation. The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the parties' efficiencies claims and that it would be
impossible to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of the merger by imposing conditions.
Finally, the Antitrust Court ruled on a case brought by the Antitrust Attorney against
Cencosud, a leading retail and supermarket company, to halt Cencosud's strategy of acquiring its smaller regional or local competitors.50 The Court ordered Cencosud to give it
5
prior notification of any subsequent acquisitions. '
C.

CARTELS

In a split decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the Antitrust Court's dismissal of a
claim filed by the Antitrust Attorney against private health insurance companies alleging a
conspiracy to reduce the coverage of certain health plans. The Court held that there was
52
insufficient evidence of collusion.
D.

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

In July 2008, the Antitrust Court approved a settlement between CCU (Chile's main
beer producer) and the Antitrust Attorney General. According to the agreement, CCU is
banned from entering into agreements that require other parties to sell CCU products
53
exclusively or that prohibit the display of non-CCU products.
VIII.
A.

China*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

China's new Anti-Monopoly Law (the AML) came into force on August 1, 2008 and is
expected to have a significant impact on multinational companies doing business in China.
The AML is administered and enforced by multiple authorities: the Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority (the AMEA), which is responsible for day-to-day enforcement,
and the Anti-Monopoly Commission (the AMC), which formulates competition policy
49. S.A.C.I Falabella and Distribuici6n y Servicio D&S S.A. Voluntary Consultation, Res. No. 24/2008
(Jan. 31, 2008), available at www.tdlc.cl.
50. Requerimiento de la FNE contra D&S S.A. y Cencosud S.A., Ruling No. 65/2008 (May 8, 2008),
available at http://www.tdlc.cl.

51. A similar case brought by the Antitrust Attorney against D&S, another leading retail and supermarket
company, was settled.
52. Sup. Ct. Ruling No. 57 (Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.tdlc.cl. For the Antitrust Court's decision, see Requerimiento de la Fiscalia Nacional Econ6mica contra Isapre LNG S.A. y otros [Complaint filed
by the Antitrust Att'y Gen. against Isapre ING S.A. and Others], Ruling No. 57/2007 (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.tdlc.cl.
53. Setdement Agreement between Antitrust Att'y Gen. and Cervecera CCU Chile Limitada, Case No. C153-08 (July 23, 2008), available at http://www.tdlc.cl.
* The contribution for China was written by Peter Wang and Yizhe Zhang of Jones Day.
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and coordinates enforcement activities. The functions of the AMEA are in turn shared by
three existing government agencies: the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), responsible
for merger review; the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), responsible for abuses of dominance and administrative abuses; and the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), responsible for price-related conduct, mainly pricefixing cartels.
Due to its broad and ambiguous language, the AML leaves much room for discretionary
enforcement. It has been reported that the AML enforcement authorities are drafting a
wide range of implementing regulations and rules for the AML. So far, however, only one
implementing regulation has been issued under the new AML: the Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings (the Notification Thresholds Regulation) issued by the Chinese State Council on August 3, 2008. 54 Without the benefit of
detailed implementing regulations or precedents. the AML presents serious compliance
challenges and risks for foreign and Chinese companies alike.
B.

MERGERS

The first decision of conditional approval under the AML involved Inbev's acquisition
of Anheuser-Busch. MOFCOM conditioned its approval of the transaction on a commitment by Inbev that it will not seek to acquire shares in two major domestic competitors
55
nor to increase the parties' existing shareholdings in two others.
This landmark decision provides a window into MOFCOM's developing merger review
practices and procedures. The parties first submitted their filing on September 10, 2008
and supplemented it twice in response to MOFCOM's requests for additional information. The filing was finally accepted on October 27, 2008 and publicly declared as approved on November 18, 2008. In other words, the pre-filing stage took more than seven
weeks, while the actual decision was released only two weeks after formal "acceptance."
As for the remedy imposed, it appears that MOFCOM may have been more concerned
about the effects of potential future transactions than the impact of this specific proposed
transaction.
C.

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

The AML prohibits various types of anticompetitive practices, including horizontal cartels, vertical resale price maintenance, and restrictive practices by dominant firms. As of
the writing of this article, no formal government enforcement actions against anticompetitive practices had yet been reported, although complaints were apparently received that
54. MOFCOM Announcement No. 95, Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings (Aug. 4, 2008) available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-08/04/content 1063769.htm (in Chinese). Notification is required if(i) the combined worldwide turnover of all undertakings involved in the last
fiscal year exceed RMB$10 billion (approximately US$1.5 billion), and the China-wide turnover of each of at
least two undertakings exceeds RMBS400 million (approximately US$60 million); or (ii) the combined Chinawide turnover of all undertakings involved in the last fiscal year exceed RMB$2 billion (approximately
US$300 million), and the China-wide turnover of each of at least two undertakings exceeds RMB$400 million
(approximately US$60 million).
55. Id. See also Li Jing, MOFCOM approves InBev, AB merger CHINA DAILY, (Nov. 19, 2008), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2008-11/19/content_7219360.hun (in English).
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Microsoft has abused its dominant market position by tying and charging monopoly (i.e.,
56
unfairly high) prices.
In the meantime, however, private litigants have seized the opportunity to bring lawsuits under the new AML. Several case filings have been reported in the press (although
none is yet close to trial), including suits against: (i) state-owned telecom companies in
Beijing for abuse of dominance; (ii) an insurance association in Chongqing for price fixing;
and (iii) the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
(AQSIQ, a department of the central government) for administrative monopoly (since
dismissed).

IX. European Union*
A.

MERGERS

In July 2008, the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) added another twist to the Sony
BMG/Impala saga, setting aside the Court of First Instance's (the CFI) annulment of the
European Commission's approval of the Sony BMG merger.5 7 The ECJ held that the
CFI had erred as a matter of law in several ways, including by misconstruing the legal
criteria applicable to a collective dominant position arising from tacit coordination. As the
CFI had only examined two of Impala's five pleas in its annulment judgment, the ECJ
referred the case back to the CFI.
After their adoption at the end of 2007, the European Commission's Non-horizontal
Merger Guidelines58 were put to their first serious tests in 2008. In three important nonhorizontal merger cases, Google/DoubleClick, 9 Nokia/Navteq, 60 and TomTom/Tele Atlas,61 the Commission undertook detailed Phase II reviews and issued extensive decisions,
eventually clearing the transactions without any remedies.
In September 2008, the CFI rejected the application of MyTravel (Airtours) for damages resulting from the Commission's unlawful decision blocking its acquisition of First
Choice.62 The CFI found that the Commission did not commit a sufficiently serious
infringement of a rule of law in its flawed collective dominance analysis or violate its duty
of diligence when examining the commitments submitted by Airtours.
56. Zhang Boling, Microsoft Faces an Antitrust Investigation, CAIJING MAGAZINE (Aug. 26, 2008), http://
english.caijing.com.cn/2008-08-26/100077444.html.
* The contribution for the European Union was provided by Gunmar Wolf and Michael Clancy from the
law firm Covington & Burling LLP.
57. Case C-413/06, Bertelsmann and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Impala, [not yet reported in E.C.R.], availableat
http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp08/aff/cpO80049en.pdf.
58. Commission Regulation C 265/6, Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 OJ. 265, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:265:0006:0025:EN:PDF.
59. Case COMP/M.4731, Google v. DoubleClick (Mar. 11, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], availableat
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731-200803 11_20682_en.pdf.
60. Case COMP/M.4942, Nokia v. Navteq (July 2, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available at http://
ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4942-20080702-20682-en.pdf.
61. Case COMP/M.4854, TomTom v. Tele Atlas (May 14, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4854_20080514_20682_en.pdf.
62. Case T-212/03, MyTravel Group plc v. Comm'n (Sept. 9, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available
at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T=212/03.
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CARTELS

The Commission's leniency program continued to produce results for the Commission's cartel unit. The seventh cartel case resolved in 2008, however, was uncovered by
the Commission following a tip-off from an anonymous source. In this case concerning
the car glass industry, the Commission imposed the highest-ever cartel fines, both on a
cartel as a whole (more than C1.38 billion/approximately US$1.79 billion63) as well as on
an individual company, i.e., Saint-Gobain (C896 million/approximately US$1.16 billion).64 The case also showed the Commission's increased fining power under its revised
fining guidelines 65 and brought the 2008 total to C2.27 billion (approximately US$2.95
billion).
On June 30, 2008, the European Commission introduced a new procedure designed to
facilitate the early settlement of cartel cases. 66 Under this procedure, if a defendant voluntarily acknowledges its involvement in the cartel and its liability, the Commission will
grant it a ten percent reduction in the fine imposed. The success of the European Commission's settlement system will depend to a significant degree on its ability to successfully
defend its cartel decisions that are currently on appeal at the Community Courts. As of
October 2008, it had successfully defended its cartel decisions in six of the eight appeals
decided by the European Court of First Instance, with parties receiving net fine reductions of fourteen percent 67 and twenty-five percent 68 in the remaining two cases.
C.

ABUSE OF A

DoMiNANT POSITION

After having earlier declared that Microsoft was in compliance with its obligations
under the 2004 Commission decision requiring, in part, the licensing of interoperability
information for Microsoft's work group servers, the European Commission imposed a
non-compliance penalty of C899 million (approximately US$1.17 billion) on February 27,
2008, arguing that Microsoft had charged unreasonable royalties for access to the interoperability information.69 Earlier, in January 2008, the Commission had announced two
63. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of CI = US$1.30.
64. See Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission fines car glass producers over C1.3 billion for market
sharing cartel (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/
1685.
65. See Press Release, Europa, Competition: Revised Commission Guidelines for setting fines in antitrust
cases - frequently asked questions (June 28, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/256.
66. The Commission's settlement package consists essentially of an implementing regulation, Commission
Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of June 30, 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, with regard to the
conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, the Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Articles 7 and 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/
2003 in cartel cases, the FAQ document, Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for cartels frequently asked questions, and a press release, Antitrust: Commission introduces settlement procedure for
cartels, all available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/legislation/settlements.html.
67. Case T-53/03, BPB SA v. Comm'n (July 8, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available at http://
curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cpO8/aff/cpO80045en.pdf.
68. Case T-410/03, Hoechst AG v. Comm'n (June 28, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], availableat http:/
/curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp8/aff/cp8OO38en.pdf.
69. Press Release, Europa, Antitrust: Commission imposes £899 million penalty on Microsoft for noncompliance with March 2004 Decision (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAc-
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new formal investigations against Microsoft for alleged abuses of its dominant market
position through tying various software products and refusing to disclose interoperability
information across a broad range of products.70
In a long-awaited judgment, Sot. Lelos kai Sia, et al. v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE,71 the ECJ
preserved the limited right of a pharmaceutical company in a dominant position to refuse
to supply orders from wholesalers who engage in parallel trade where such orders are not
"ordinary." The Court referred to two factors a national court can use to assess whether
an order is "ordinary": first, the size of the order "in relation to the requirements of the
market in the first Member State;" and, second, "the previous business relations between
72
that undertaking and the wholesalers concerned."
X.
A.

France*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The new Law for the Modernization of the Economy was adopted on August 4, 200873
and its implementing regulation was adopted on November 13, 2008. 74 This is the most
important change to French competition law since the New Economic Regulations Act
2001.
1. Merger Reforms
The merger review powers formerly exercised by the Ministry of the Economy (the
Ministry) have been transferred to the new Competition Authority (Autorit de la Concurrence). But the Ministry retains a rather controversial "evocation" power, enabling it to
compel an in-depth investigation of a transaction cleared by the Competition Authority in
Phase I and reverse a Phase II clearance or prohibition decision on public interest
75
grounds.
A "stop the clock" mechanism was also introduced whereby the parties (in Phase I and
Phase H) and the Competition Authority (only in Phase II) can require the suspension of
tion.doreference=IP/08/318. Microsoft has appealed this decision. See Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp v.
Comm'n, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Rechercher&alldocs=
Alldocs&doj=Docj&docop=Docop&docor=Docor&docjo=Docjo&numaff=T- 167/08.
70. Press Release, Europa, Competition: Commission initiates formal investigations against Microsoft in
two cases of suspected abuse of dominant market position (Jan. 14, 2008), availableat http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/19.
71. Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 (Sept. 16, 2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006J0468:EN:HTML.
72. Id. 1 77.
* The contribution for France was provided by Maria Trabucchi, Jr6me Fabre, C16mentine Baldon, and
Caroline Genevois of Weil, Gotshal & Manges.
73. Law No. 2008-776 of Aug. 4, 2008, Journal Officiel de la Rtpublique Franqaise LJ.O.] [Official Gazette
of France], Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=?cidTexte=JORFTFEXTOO
0019283050.
74. Ordinance No. 2008-1161 of Nov. 13, 2008 Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise 1.O.] (Official
Gazette of France], Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXTOOOO
19758031.
75. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. coM.] art. L430-7-I (created by Law No. 2008-776, Aug. 4, 2008), available
at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
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the merger examination period where this proves necessary (e.g., if the parties submit
undertakings).76 This time-extension is limited to fifteen working days in Phase I and
twenty working days in Phase II.
Finally, the new law introduces lower notification thresholds for mergers in the retail
77
sector.
2.

Process Reform

The Ministry's powers to investigate anticompetitive practices were also transferred to
the Competition Authority. Appeal rights against dawn raids have been imposed in order
to address concerns regarding the conformity of France's antitrust investigations with the
European Convention on Human Rights. 78 In particular, investigated companies now
have a right to appeal judicial orders authorizing dawn raids before the First President of
the relevant Court of Appeal, whereas previously only matters of form and procedure
could be disputed directly before the French Civil Supreme Court. There will now also
be a hearing officer, whose function is to ensure that the legal rights of companies involved in procedures before the Competition Authority are safeguarded, whether in
merger control or an antitrust infringement investigation.79
B.

MERGERS

One hundred clearance decisions were issued in the first ten months of 2008, five of
which were subject to undertakings, including one following an in-depth investigation
(Phase 1I).
In the only Phase II case, the Ministry assessed the conglomerate effects of a transaction
in the market for components of rolling shutters.8 0 The Ministry found that the transaction would give the merged entity the incentive and ability to foreclose the market
through tying and bundling strategies. But the Ministry cleared the transaction subject to
behavioral remedies, including that the parties refrain from: (i) offering rebates for the
simultaneous purchase of their products, and (ii) changing the technical characteristics of
their products so as to make them incompatible with rival products.
The Ministry also condemned two failures to submit filings for notifiable transactions
pursuant to Article L. 430-8 of the French Commercial Code. Both fines were moderate,
76. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. coM.] art. L. 430-5-H1 (modified by Law No. 2008-776, Aug. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
77. A merger between companies owning and managing retail outlets will be notifiable if the aggregate
global turnover of the parties to the transaction exceeds C75 million (approximately US$98 million), as opposed to the usual C1 50/US$195 million threshold, and at least two of the parties have a turnover in France
in excess of C15 million (approximately US$20 million), as opposed to the usual C50 million/US$65 million
threshold.
78. Rayon v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. [not yet listed in reporter] Application No. 18497/03 (2008), availableat
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkpl 97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A2 7FD8FB86 142BF01 C I 166D
EA398649&key=68558&sessionld= 15231671 &skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true.
79. CODE DE COMMERCE [C. com.] art. L461-4 (created by Law No. 2008-776, Aug. 4, 2008), availableat
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. This is meant to follow the EU example.
80. See Bulletin Officiel de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la R~pression des Fraudes re. Case
C2007-171 Somfy v. Zurfliih-Feller No. 6 (Ministry of Econ., July 24, 2008), availableat http://www.dgccrf.
bercy.gouv.fr/boccrf/2008/08_06bis/c2007_l 7 lsomfy_zurfiuhfeller.pdf.
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as one failure to file was not deliberates l and the other was the result of the urgency of the
82
situation.
XI.
A.

Germany*
MERGERS

Transactions in which the parties have combined global revenues of more than C500
million (approximately US$650 million)8 3 can trigger German merger review if one of the
parties has revenues greater than C25 million (approximately US$32.5 million) in Germany, provided the other party has some more than de minimis nexus to Germany. A
legislative proposal has been placed before Parliament to introduce a C5 million (approximately US$6.5 million) domestic revenue threshold for the second party in a transaction.
It is expected that this change will be enacted in 2009 and will significantly reduce the
84
number of German merger notifications.
The Federal Cartel Office (FCO) also published a notice in which it clarified that transactions closed without a clearance will not be reviewed within the standard merger review
procedure but will instead be subject to a "dissolution proceeding."85 If the result would
otherwise have been a clearance, the proceeding will be completed by way of an informal
or formal "no action letter." If there would not have been a clearance, a dissolution order
may be issued. The main consequence is that the strict merger review timeline does not
apply and therefore reviews can take significantly longer. The new practice has also created a level of uncertainty as to the civil validity of acts of closing performed without the
necessary FCO clearance, even if the FCO ultimately decides to take "no action." Fines
remain unchanged and are applied increasingly.
In one of the most notable cases of 2008, the FCO prohibited A-Tec's acquisition of a
thirteen percent share in competitor Norddeutsche Affinerie. The FCO concluded that
the acquisition would give A-Tec a "competitively significant influence" 8 6 in Norddeutsche because A-Tec would have a blocking minority of twenty-five percent of the votes at
Norddeutsche's annual meeting. This decision is very relevant to publicly listed companies-where shareholder presence at annual meetings is often below fifty percent-since
81. See Bulletin Officiel de laConcurrence, de laConsommation et de laRepression des Fraudes re. Nova-

trans v. SNCF Participations No. 2 (Ministry of Econ., Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.dgccrf.bercy.
gouv.fr/boccrfI2008/0802bis/c2007 99 arrete sncfparticipations novatrans.pdf.
82. See Bulletin Officiel de laConcurrence, de laConsommation etde laRbpression des Fraudes re. Case
C2007-174 Arcadie Centre Est /Groupe Bigard No. 7 (Ministry of Econ., Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://

www.dgccrf.bercy.gouv.fr/boccrf/2008/08 -7bis/c2OO7-

74.-arrete-bigard actifsarcadiefranceest.pdf.

* The contribution for Germany was provided by Dr. Andreas Weitbrecht and Susanne Zuehlke of
Latham & Watkins LLP.

83. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of EU$1 = US$1.30.
84. See generally MEG Um, available at http://www.bmwi.de/BMVi/Redaktion/PDF/Gesetz/meg-3entwurf,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf (forthcoming 2009). The remaining merger
thresholds will remain unchanged.
85. See FCO, Mitteilung: Keine nacrbmglicheAnmeldung Bereits Vollzogener Zusammenschlisse, http://www.
bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Merkbaetter/Merkbaetter-deutsch/Mitteiung-zur-Behandlung nachtraeglich-angemeldeterZusammenschluesse.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
86. See FCO, Act Against Restraints on Competition, § 37, T 1, No. 4, available at http:/lwww.
bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/GW'B/0712_G3AB-mitInhaltsverzeichnisE.pdf.
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it was held that a shareholding below twenty-five percent could still result in a de facto
87
blocking minority.
Other notable transactions reviewed by the FCO in 2008 include a major supermarket
merger (cleared subject to a condition precedent), a planned merger between producers of
locking systems (prohibited), and an acquisition by a major cable operator of additional
cable assets (cleared).88
B.

ABUSE OF A DoMinANr

PosrrIoN

The FCO focused a significant portion of its efforts in 2008 on the energy sector. For
example, the FCO created a new unit to deal with investigations of abuse of dominance in
the energy sector. It also obtained commitments from twenty-nine of thirty-three gas
suppliers undcr investigation for excessive pricing to refund C127 milhon (approximately
US$165 million) to consumers. 89 Finally, the Higher Regional Court in Disseldorf confirmed the FCO's rules for gas supply contracts. Pursuant to these rules, contracts where
the gas supplier fills more than eighty percent of a customer's requirements may not exceed two years in duration, and contracts that cover between fifty and eighty percent of
the customer's requirements may not exceed four years in duration. 90
C.

OTHER ENFORCEMENT

AcrbONS

In 2008, significant fines for cartel activity were imposed in a number of sectors, including liquid gas, luxury cosmetics, branded drugstore products, pharmaceutical companies,
and pharmacies, decor paper productions, and road salt production. 91 In a highly publi87. Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office] Feb 27, 2008, B5-198/07, (appealed), available at http://
www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/download/pdf/Fusion/Fusion08/B5-198-07.pdfnavid=73.
88. Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], June 30, 2008, B2-333/07, available at http://www.
bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/download/pdf/Fusion/FusionO8/B2 -333-07_Internet.pd.navid=73;
Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel Office], Nov. 5, 2008, B5-25/08, available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.
de./wDeutsch/download/pdf/FusionFusionO8/B5-25-O8neu.pdfnavid=73; Bundeskartellamt [Federal Cartel
Office], Apr. 3, 2008, B7-200/07, available at htrp://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/download/pdf/Fusion/Fusion08/B7-200-07.pdfnavid=73.
89. See Press Release, FCO, Price Abuse Proceedings Against Gas Suppliers Largely Completed (Dec. 1,
2008), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2008/2008-12 01.
php.
90. Higher Regional Court Duesseldorf, Decision of Oct. 4, 2007, VI-Kart 1/06 (V) - E.ON Ruhrgas
(appealed), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de.
91. See Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamt imposes Millionenbuflen against LPG Company (Dec. 19,
2007), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2007/2007
12 19.
php.; see also Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamt Imposes Millionenbulen Against Mfrs. of Luxury Cosmetics Market Info. Uuly 10, 2008), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2008/2008_07_10.php; see also Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamt Imposed Against
Drugstore Millionenbuflen Products Manufacturer (Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.
de./wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2008/2008_ 02_20.php; see also Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamt Imposes Fines Against Orgs. and Pharm. Mfrs. Because of Calls to the Pharmacist, the Retail Prices
Recommended by the Mfr. to Comply (Jan. 8, 2008), availableat http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/
archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2008/2008_0l.08.php; see also Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamt Imposes
Fines Against Bayer Vital (May 28, 2008), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/archiv/
PressemeldArchiv/2008/2008_OS_28.php; see also Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamt Imposes Fines
Against Decorative Paper Mfr. (Feb. 5, 2008), availableat http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/archiv/
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cized and controversial move, the FCO also ruled against the planned central marketing of
broadcasting rights for Bundesliga soccer matches. The planned system would have provided Pay TV with exclusive rights on late Saturday afternoons and evenings. The FCO
found that this arrangement did not sufficiently benefit consumers. 92
XII.
A.

Hungary*
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Hungarian Parliament passed a Bill in June 200893 to amend Hungary's Competition Act.94 But the Bill is not yet in force because the President of the Republic of Hungary has sent the text to Hungary's Constitutional Court for review, on the grounds that
certain of its provisions would violate the constitutional principles protecting the "presumption of innocence" and the "right to judicial review."
The proposed amendments in the Bill deal with the following areas: (i) sanctions
against cartels; (ii) consequences for violating certain other provisions of the Competition
Act; and (iii) the Economic Competition Office (the ECO), Hungary's competition
authority.
With respect to cartels, the Bill extends the range of possible sanctions by providing
that an executive officer implicated in a price fixing cartel will be prohibited from serving
as an executive officer of another business association for a period of two years from the
date of the final decision of the Competition Council or, in the case of an appeal, from the
date of the decision of the Appellate Court.
The Bill also proposes to establish a legal presumption of harm applicable to civil damage claims in relation to cartels violating Article 81 of the EC Treaty or Section 11 of the
Competition Act. This presumption, applicable only in the case of "hard core" cartels,
would provide that the economic harm resulting from the cartel should be deemed to be
an overcharge equivalent to ten percent of the price of the product, unless the defendant

proves otherwise. The objective of this presumption is to lift the burden of proof from
plaintiffs (unless they wish to claim that damages were higher than 10 percent of the actual
price).
The Bill also codifies the main points of the ECO's leniency policy, although the ECO
retains the right to issue further directives concerning the leniency policy pursuant to
section 36(6) of the Competition Act. 95
PressemeldArchiv/2008/2008_02.05.php; see also Press Release, FCO, Bundeskartellamrt fines Auftausalzhersteller (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/

2008/200811 12.php.
92. See Press Release, FCO, DFL Mktg. Model to TV Rights Does Not Conform to the Requirements of
Antitrust Law (July 24, 2008), http://www.bundeskartellamt.de./wDeutsch/archiv/PressemeldArchiv/2008/
2008_07_24.php.
* The contribution for Hungary was written by Kornelia Nagy-Koppany, LL.M of K&P LLP, Budapest.
93. See Bill T/5657, available at http://www.parlament.hu/irom38/05657/05657.pdf.
94. Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Competition, available at
http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/5723964CO9A66629.pdf.
95. The ECO's leniency policy is currently set forth in Joint Directive No. 3/2003 of the President of the
ECO and the President of the Competition Council. The consolidated version of the Directive's English text
is available at http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/pdf/print_4212-h.pdf.
Since the Direc-
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With respect to other provisions of the Competition Act, the most important modification in the Bill is the introduction of the "substantial lessening of competition" (SLC) or
"significant impediment to effective competition" (SIEC) test for assessing concentrations, which is consistent with the standard used by the European Commission.
The Bill also extends the ECO's authority in several respects, including giving it jurisdiction over violations of the recently enacted prohibitions against unfair commercial
practices and deceptive and comparative advertising.96
B.

CASES AND PROCEEDINGS

In 2008, the ECO continued to investigate the banking sector 97 and the retail sector,
particularly the relationship between larger retail networks and their suppliers. 98
In June 2008, the Metropolitan Chartered Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment of
the Metropolitan Court against three companies for collusion in the bidding phase of a
public tender for road reconstruction work in violation of Section 11 of the Competition
Act. 99 The companies were fined between HIUF$52 million (approximately US$2.6 million) and H=F$137 million (approximately US$6.85 million). ° °
XIII.
A.

Indonesia*

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In 2008, the Supervisory Commission on Business Competition (the KPPU) issued
guidelines on the implementation of Article 50(a) of the Indonesian Law on Prohibition of
Monopolistic Practice and Unfair Business Competition (Law 5/1999).101 Article 50(a)

establishes an exemption from the prohibition against anticompetitive conduct and agreetive is non-binding, the Bill's purpose is to codify its main elements in order to comply with the principles of
legal certainty and the undertaking of the ECO within the framework of the European Competition
Network.
96. Act XCVII of 2008 (the "UCP Act") deals with unfair commercial practices. The UCP Act came into
effect on September 1, 2008. The Hungarian text is available at http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/
module25/5350079F73EC50C8.pdf; Act XLVIII of 2008 on Essential Conditions of and Certain Limitations
to Business Advertising, art. 24, § (2)-(3), available at http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/
5946837CDBA9C919.pdf. The ECO has entered into a cooperation agreement with the National Consumer
Protection Authority and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, which are responsible for prosecuting violations of the UCP.
97. The manuscript was dated April 28, 2008 and published on September 26, 2008. The manuscript is
available at http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/60783C124E3D9611.pdf.
98. This document was dated June 9, 2008 and published on June 19, 2008. It is available at http://
www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/476789A146BCOAC7.pdf.
99. The ECO decision was published on March 18, 2004. The Hungarian text of this decision is available
at http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&pg=l l&st=l&m5 doc=3757.
100. The judgment in case Nr. 2.Kf.27.052/2007, which is dated June 11, 2008, is one of the largest fines
ever imposed on Hungarian road construction companies. The Hungarian text of this decision is available at
http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/5021847AD6ACD66A.pdf.
* The contribution for Indonesia was written by Widyawan and Ponco Prawoko of Widyawan &
Partners.
101. Indonesia. Law No. 5 of 1999 (Mar. 5, 2000), available at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/
regions/asia/Indonesia/uu-monopoli_(english) 1.pdf.
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ments in LAW 5/1999.102 Conduct or agreements can be exempted pursuant to Article
50(a) if they are authorized by law or implementing regulation, and the agent engaging in
the conduct or entering into the agreement is an agent formed or appointed by the Indonesian Government.
The KPPU also issued guidelines on the implementation of Article 47 of Law 5/1999
regarding administrative sanctions. 10 3 The guidelines address, inter alia, the payment of
damages to injured parties and the imposition of fines, which can range from IDR$1 billion to IDR$25 billion (approximately US$100,000 to US$2.5 million). 10 4 Additionally,
the KPPU introduced draft guidelines on the implementation of Article 19 of Law 5/1999
on market dominance.105 The draft guidelines include examples of monopolistic conduct
and unfair competitive behavior and provide that fines for such conduct can range from
IDR 1 billion to IDR 100 billion (approximately US$100,000 to US$10 million). Finally,
the KPPU Secretariat is now authorized to handle certain conspiracy cases having a value
of not more than IDR 10 billion (approximately US$1 million), or any other case with the
approval of the KPPU.106

B.

ANICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In the Manulife case, the KPPU determined that there was no conspiracy in the auctioning of 40 percent of the shares owned by the bankrupt PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera
in PT Asuransi Jiwa Manulife Indonesia (AJMI).' 0 7 The KPPU noted that although the
auction had only one bidder (The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, which is an
AJMI shareholder); it was carried out to implement that shareholder's pre-emptive right
as set out in AJMI's articles of association. Therefore, the auction was in compliance with
Indonesian company and bankruptcy laws.
In the EMI case, 108 the KPPU found a conspiracy among EMI Music South East Asia
(EMISEA), PT EMI Indonesia, two individuals, and a popular Indonesian band in relation
to the band changing record labels from PT Aquarius Musikindo to EMISEA. Confidential information (e.g., royalty rates, advances, and penalties) in the agreement between PT
Aquarius Musikindo and the band was found to have been shared amongst the accused.
EMISEA and PT EMI Indonesia were fined IDR 1 billion (approximately US$100,000)
and ordered to pay damages of approximately IDR 3.8 billion (approximately
US$380,000) to PT Aquarius Musikindo.
102. See KPPU DECISION, CASE No.253/KPPU/KEP/VI/2008 (JULY 31, 2008), available at http://

www.kppu.go.id/docs/Pedoman/pasaL50a.pdf.
103. See KPPU Decision, Case No.252/KPPU/Kep/VIII2008 (July 31, 2008), available at http://
www.kppu.go.id/docs/Pedoman/pasal-47.pdf.
104. US $1=IDR 10,000.
105. Indonesian Legal Brief, General Corporate Issue No. 826 (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://
ww w.hukumonline.com.

106. See K.PPU Reg. No. 2 (2008) (entered into effect on Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/SK/SK_02_2008.pdf.
107. See KPPU Decision, Case No.17/KPPU-L/2007 (Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/putusanmanulife.pdf.
108. See KPPU Decision, Case No.19/KPPU-L/2007 (Apr. 24, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/puusanEMI.pdf.
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In two notable cases, the Makassar Cargo case' 0 9 and the Clean Water Management
case,1 0 the KPPU determined that the defendant companies had engaged in monopolistic
practices and imposed fines of IDR$1 billion (approximately US$100,000) and IDR$2
billion (approximately US$200,000), respectively.
In the Short Message Service (SMS) case," I an interconnection agreement entered into
by mobile telephone operators (XL, Telkomsel, Telkom, Bakrie, Mobile-8, and Smart) was
found to fix prices for SMS messages. Fines imposed by the KPPU varied from IDR$4
billion (approximately US$400,000, for Bakrie) to IDR$25 billion (approximately US$2.5
million, for XL and Telkomsel) 12 Smart was not fined, as it was a new entrant with little
bargaining power.
In the Batam Taxi case, 113 certain taxi companies operating at seven seaports and an
airport in Batam were found to have infringed Law 5/1999 by engaging in price fixing,
market allocation, and monopolistic behavior, as well as by preventing competitors from
operating at certain locations. The relevant taxi operators and a Batam Center seaport
operator were jointly and severally fined IDR$1 billion (approximately US$100,000).
Also of note were KPPU decisions regarding discriminatory practices in the subsidized
5
14
fertilizer sector' and outdoor advertising sector."
XIV. Ireland*
A.

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRAT1VE DEVELOPMENTS

The Irish government introduced emergency legislation on October 2, 2008, in response to ongoing turmoil in global inter-bank credit markets. The new legislation, the
116
Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 (the Act), has two principal functions.
First, it allows the Minister for Finance (the Minister) to provide financial support (including guarantees) in respect of deposits in, and borrowings by, any credit institution
designated by the Minister under the Act. Second, the Act modifies the Irish merger
control rules applicable to any merger or acquisition involving an Irish-licensed credit
institution, whether or not that institution has received or is receiving financial support
from the State. In that regard, if the Minister is of the opinion that a proposed merger
109. See KPPU Decision, Case No.22/KPPU-L/2007 (May 22, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/putusanCargo-Makassar.pdf.
110. See KPPU Decision, Case No. 11/KPPU-L/2008 (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/putusan.ATB.pdf.
111. See KPPU Decision, Case No.26/KPPU-L/2007 (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/putusan-SMS.pdf.
112. Fines of IDR 5 billion and IDR 18 billion were levied against Mobile-8 and Telkom, respectively.
113. See KPPU Decision, Case No. 28/KPPU-1/2007 (June 18, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.iddocs/PutusanlputusanTaksi-Batam.pdf.
114. See KPPU Decision, Case No. 10/KPPU-L/2008 (Aug. 19, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/putusanPetrokimia.pdf.
115. See KPPU Decision, Case No. 02/KPPU-L/2008 (Aug. 19, 2008), available at http://www.kppu.go.id/
docs/Putusan/putusanReklame.pdf.
* The contribution for Ireland was written by Philip Andrews, Gerald FitzGerald, and tOna Butler of
McCann FitzGerald in Dublin, Ireland.
116. Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 (Act No. 18/2008) (Ir.), available at http://
www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2008/al808.pdf.
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involving an Irish-licensed credit institution is necessary to maintain the stability of the
Irish financial system and that there would be a serious threat to the stability of that
system if the merger did not proceed, then the power to review the transaction will lie
with the Minister rather than with the Competition Authority (the Authority)."7
The Authority issued sectoral reports in 2008 with respect to: groceries,"8 veterinarians," 9 and pharmaceutical products and services. 120 The Authority also welcomed the
decision of the Irish Dental Council to review advertising restrictions on dentists, pursuant to the Authority's recommendation in 2007.121

B.

MERGERS

The Authority had received thirty-three merger notifications in the first ten months of
2008. It prohibited only one of these transactions, the proposed acquisition by Kerry
Group plc of Breeo Foods Limited and Breeo Brands Limited. 22 The parties are two of
Ireland's leading food companies, active in the distribution of many of the country's
household names in consumer foods. The Authority found that the merger would substantially lessen competition in three markets: (i) rashers (i.e., uncooked bacon), (ii) nonpoultry cooked meats, and (iii) processed cheese. This is only the third occasion on which
the Authority has blocked a proposed merger since the entry into effect of the current
Irish merger control legislation inJanuary 2003. Kerry Group plc has lodged an appeal to
123
the High Court against the Authority's decision.

117.

See id. § 7.
118. See Press Release, Competition Auth., Competition Authority Publishes Study of the Grocery Sector
(Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item=212; see
also Press Release, Competition Auth., Competition Authority Report Finds Competition between Grocers is
Ltd. by the Retail Planning System (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/
NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item=225; see also Press Release, Competition Auth., Grocery Monitor: Report
No. 3, Executive Summary (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://www.tca.ie/controls/getimage.ashx?image-id=
2137.
119. See Press Release, Competition Auth., Competition Auth. Finds Room for Improvement in Competition Between Vets Gune 19, 2008), http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?
selecteditem=217.
120. Press Release, Competition Auth., Enforcement Decision of Competition Authority Investigation: Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct by the Health Service Executive Relating to the Administration of the Community Drugs Schemes, ED/01/008 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/
NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item=228.
121. See Press Release, Competition Auth., News Release, Competition Authority Finds a Lack of Competition in Dental Services is Pushing Up Prices in Ireland (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/
NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected-item=203; see also Press Release, Competition Auth., Competition
Authority Welcomes New Rules on Dentists Adver. (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleasesfNewsReleases.aspx?selected item=223.
122. Determination in Merger No. M/08/009-Kerry/Breeo, Competition Auth. (Aug. 28, 2008), availableat
http://www.tca.ie/MergersAcquisitions/MergerNotifications.aspx?selecteditem=399.
123. See Ciarin Hancock, Kerry to Appeal Competition Autbority Ruling on Breeo Sale, IRsui TIMES, Sept. 30,
2008, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ftnance/2008/0930/1222724571685.html.
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CARTELS

Several prosecutions were concluded in 2008 in relation to a price-fixing cartel run by
the Citroen Dealers Association.1 24 In May 2008, a Citroen car dealer based in the northeast of Ireland received a three-month suspended sentence and the company of which he
was a director was fined C12,000 (approximately US$15,000)125 by the Circuit Criminal
Court. In October 2008, another Citroen dealer based in the north-east of Ireland received a three-month suspended sentence and the company of which he was a director was
fined C20,000 (approximately US$25,000) by the same Court. 126 Several other prosecutions remain pending.

D.

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

In April 2008, the Irish High Court began hearing a damages action brought by the
sugar importer ASI Sugar Limited (ASI) against Greencore Group plc (formerly the
State-owned sugar company Irish Sugar plc (Irish Sugar)) for abusing its dominant position in the Irish sugar market. 12 7 The case represented the first "follow-on" antitrust
private damages action in Ireland resulting from an enforcement decision of the European
Commission. The proceedings were settled prior to the conclusion of the hearing, but the
terms of the settlement have not been made public.

E.

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In January 2008, the Authority closed its inquiry into a complaint by the publisher of
the free newspaper, Metro, regarding the refusal of the Joint National Readership Survey
(NRS) to include the publication in the JNRS' readership survey. The Authority concluded its inquiry after JNRS amended its admission criteria to permit free newspapers
2 s
such as Metro to be included in its survey.
In November 2008, the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) ruled that an agreement
concluded between the ten principal beef and veal processors in Ireland, and which required, among other things, a reduction of roughly twenty-five percent in processing capacity, had as its object the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the
meaning of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. 129 The matter had been referred to the ECJ

124. See Er-carDealerFinedfor Fixing Prices,IRISH TIMEs, May 9, 2008, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2008/0509/12102 84926634.html.
125. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of EU$I = US$1.30.
126. See Elaine Keogh, Suspended Sentence and Fine for Fixing Prices of Citroen Cars, IRISH TIMEs, Oct. 29,
2008, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/l029/1225197273487.html.
127. ASI Sugar Ltd v. Greencore Group plc & Ors (Record No. 1996/8200P) (on file with authors).
128. See Press Release, Competition Auth., The Competition Authority welcomes the inclusion of free
newspapers in the Joint National Readership (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selecteditem=209.
129. Case C-209/07, Competition Auth. v. Beef Indus. Dev. Soc'y Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore)
Meats Ltd., [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available at http://curia.europa.eu/.
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by the Irish Supreme Court, which must now decide whether the agreement fulfils any of
the conditions for exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.130

XV.
A.

Israel*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A proposed amendment to the Israeli Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988 (the
Antitrust Law)131 was introduced on June 19, 2008132 to broaden the scope of Section 50
of the Antitrust Law. Currently, Section 50 provides that a breach of the provisions of the
Antitrust Law will constitute a tort for the purposes of civil liability. The proposed
amendment provides that a breach of the instructions of the Director General or of the
Antitrust Tribunal also will constitute torts for this purpose. The amendment also pro-

poses to change the Antitrust Law's regulation of concentrated (oligopolistic) markets. It
is generally acknowledged that the Antitrust Law's current definition of "concentration" is
unclear in that it seeks to rely on the measure of competition between firms in a market,
for which there exist no real empirical measures. It is proposed to revise the definition of
"concentration" so that the focus of analysis will be on whether conditions exist in the
market that facilitate or stifle effective competition, such as barriers to entry or cross-

ownership structures.

B.

MERGERS

The Director General's Guidelines Regarding the Process of Reporting and the Assessment of Mergers in Terms of the Antitrust Law, 1988 (the Guidelines) were enacted in
2008.133 The Guidelines address in detail many aspects of merger reporting and assessment, including: what will be considered to be an early implementation of a merger, i.e.,
implementation of a merger without the required regulatory approval; when the Director

General will regard control as having been de facto acquired; various issues related to the
timing of notification of a merger; what will be considered to be an internal reorganization as opposed to a merger; the Director General's approach to an acquisition of the

assets of a company as a merger; and what kinds of legal persons, such as individuals and
foreign companies, will be considered to be "acquiring companies" for the purposes of
merger control.

130. See Press Release, Competition Auth., Supreme Court Refers Question in Beef Industry Case to ECJ,
Apr. 19, 2007, available at http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selecteditem=193.
* The contribution for Israel was written by Eytan Epstein, Tamar Dolev-Green, and Michelle Morrison
of Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co.
131. Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988, S.H. 128 (Isr.).
132. Proposed Amendment to the Antitrust Law (no. 11), 2008, available at http://eng-archive.antitrust.
gov.il (search for Publication No. 5000968).
133. More information available at w 1 u7fl,"'
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ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

In a notable 2008 case, Re: Bezeq, the Israel Telecomm. Corp.,134 the Commissioner found
that Bezeq, the dominant supplier of telecommunications services in Israel and, until recently, a state-owned monopoly, had abused its monopoly in contravention of section 29A
of the Antitrust Law. The case involved an illegal strike by Bezeq workers in 2006, as a
result of which the reciprocal connection between Bezeq and HOT Telecoms (HOT), a
small, upstart telecommunications provider, was disconnected for approximately thirtyfour hours. During this time, HOT customers could not be connected with Bezeq customers. The Commissioner found that in the weeks leading up to the illegal strike, Bezeq
management had willfully ignored indications that its employees had devised a strategy to
further their grievances against the company by harming Bezeq's new competitors, thus
exposing Bezeq to damaging antitrust litigation. Bezeq has appealed the Commissioner's
decision.
XVI.
A.

Italy*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

On November 15, 2007, the Italian Competition Authority (the ICA) issued two Resolutions 135 establishing procedural rules governing proceedings for unfair commercial practices and misleading and unlawful comparative advertising. 136 Among other things,
proceedings must last no more than 120 days and there is no requirement for a "market
test" phase if parties offer up commitments to resolve a matter.
B.

MERGERS

In December 2007, the ICA authorized the merger between AEM S.p.A. (AEM) and
ASM Brescia S.p.A. (ASM). The transaction involved several markets: the production and
supply of electrical energy and gas, waste management, heat management, facility management, and integrated water systems. The ICA cleared the merger after ASM undertook to terminate the structural links existing between itself and a major company in the
137
wholesale market for electrical energy.
In January 2008, the ICA cleared the merger between Intesa SanPaolo and Cassa di
Risparmio Firenze, subject to a number of conditions, including: (i) the divestiture of
134. Determination according to Paragraph 43(a)(5) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 1988, Re: Bezeq,

the Israel Telecomm. Corp. - abuse of position in the market, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://engarchive.antitrust.gov.il/ANTItem.aspx?ID=37&FromSubject=&FromYear=2009&FromPage=0.
* The contribution for Italy was written by Alberto Pera and Michele Carpagnano of Giarmi, Origoni,
Grippo & Parmers.
135. Italian Competition Authority, Regulation on Procedures for Investigating Unfair Commercial Practices, Measure No. 17589 (Nov. 15, 2007), avaliable at http://www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm; Italian Competition Authority, Procedures for Investigating Misleading & Unlawful Comparative Advertising, Measure No.
17590 (Nov. 15, 2007), avaliable at http://www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm.
136. Italian Competition Authority, Legislative Decree No. 145 (Aug. 2, 2007), avaliable at http://
www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm; Italian Competition Authority, Legislative Decree No. 146 (Aug. 2, 2007),
avaliable at http://www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm.
137. ICA, 13 dec. 2007, Decision No. 17723, in case C8835, AEVI/ASM Brescia.
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twenty-nine retail bank branches to an unrelated third party, and (ii) the unwinding of a
joint venture in the consumer credit sector. According to the ICA, the divestitures described under (i) above were necessary to maintain competition in the retail bank, asset
management, financial services, savings management, and insurance markets, while the
unwinding of the joint venture would prevent the creation of a dominant position in the
13s
consumer credit market.
In May 2008, the ICA cleared a merger between Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Banca
Antonveneta. The clearance was subject to several conditions, including: (i) the divestiture by Monte dei Paschi di Siena of several retail bank branches, mainly located in Tuscany; (ii) the termination of relationships with major groups in the insurance sector
through the unwinding of existing joint ventures and the termination of bank insurance
agreements; and (iii) a commitment not to appoint anyone to the merged entity's Board of
Directors or Supervisory Committee who also holds the same positions with a competing
bank.139
C.

CARTELS

In September 2007, the ICA fined four companies active in the pharmaceutical distribution sector C24,915 (approximately US$32,000)140 for their collective refusal to supply
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs to the so-called "parafarmacie"(i.e., shops that sell nonprescription drugs).141 In May 2008, the ICA sanctioned an agreement in the same sector
carried out by the Teramo association of pharmacists that was aimed at setting the maximum level of discounts for OTC drugs. The association was fined C11,200 (approximately
US$14,000).142
In October 2007, the ICA imposed a fine of approximately C10 million (approximately
US$13 million) on fifteen major operators in local public transport markets. The ICA
found that the operators coordinated their behavior in responding to public bids for the
assignment of public transport services. This conduct was designed mainly to divide up
markets in order to preserve the position of incumbent operators and to raise barriers to
entry for new competitors.
D. ABUSE OF A DomINANT POSITION
In October 2008, the ICA fined Aeroporti di Roma S.p.A. (ADR) C1.6 million (approximately US$2.1 million) for abuse of a dominant position. 143 ADR is the exclusive manager of the main commercial airports of Rome (Fiumicino and Ciampino). The conduct
sanctioned by the ICA included the charging of "abusive" prices for refueling services, the
leasing of space at almost twice the market rate, and charges for certain services (e.g.,
138. ICA, 17 jan 2008, Decision No. 17859, in case C8939, Intesa SanPaolo/Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze.

139. ICA, 7 may 2008, Decision No. 18327, in case C9182, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena/Banca
Antonveneta.

140. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of EURO 1=US$1.30.
141. ICA, 20 sep. 2007, Decision No. 17362, in case 1678, Distribuzione di farmaci senza obbligo di ricetta
alle parafarmacie.
142. ICA, 29 may 2008, Decision No. 18421, in case 1684, Federfarma Teramo-Sconi sui prezzi al
pubblico.
143. ICA, 23 Oct 2008, Decision No. 19020, in case A376, Aeropori di Roma-Tariffe Aeroportuali.
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handling) in the "Fiumicino cargo city," the area of the airport dedicated to the transport
of goods.

XVII. Japan*
A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A bill to amend the Anti-Monopoly Act (the AMA) was submitted to the Diet in March
2008.144 The bill proposes pre-closing notification for share acquisitions and a surcharge
to be imposed on companies or individuals who engage in behavior deemed to be an
unfair trade practice, including exclusionary types of private monopolization, a range of
misleading representations, and abuse of a superior bargaining position. But the passage
of the bill is uncertain due to developments in the Japanese political environment.

B.

MERGERS

In March 2007, new merger guidelines came into effect which reflected the new way
that the JFFC would analyze merger transactions subject to its review.1 45 One of the
most important features was to clarify that the JFTC could, where appropriate, expand the
relevant geographic market beyond Japan when considering the possible effect of a proposed merger. The JFTC applied this expanded approach when it approved TDK Corporation's acquisition from Alps Electric Co., Ltd. of assets used for the manufacturing of
magnetic heads. 14 6 The JFTC held that the relevant market consisted of the global market for magnetic heads, based on its finding that magnetic head manufacturers sell their
147
products at similar prices regardless of geographic origin.
Another significant development was the JFTC's issuance of an order requiring BHP
Ltd. to produce information relevant to BHP's proposed take-over of Rio-Tinto.14 8 In
the past, the JFTC had not commenced investigations of share acquisitions until after
closing given that share acquisitions are only subject to post-closing notification.

C.

CARTELS

On November 11, 2008, the JFTC filed criminal complaints with the public prosecutor
general against three steel companies-Nippon Steel & Sumikin Coated Sheet Corp.,
Nisshin Steel Co., Ltd. and Yodogawa Steel Works Ltd.-alleging that they had formed a
* The contribution for Japan was written by Shigeyoshi Ezaki of Anderson Mori & Tomotsune.
144. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Submission of the Anti-Monopoly Act Amendment Bill to
the Diet (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/inde08.html.
145. See Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Policies Dealing With Prior Consultation Regarding
Business Combination (Mar. 28, 2007), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/MAprior
consultation.pdf.
146. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Major M&A cases during the fiscal year 2007, 39 (June
2008), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/08.june/08061301 .pdf.
147. Id. at 39.
148. Hidetaka Matsuyam, Sec'y Gen. of the Fair Trade Comm'n of Japan, Remarks at press conference of
Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/teirei/h20/kaikenkirokuO8O9O3.html#k080903-l.
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cartel to fix prices for the sale of galvanized steel. 149 JFE Galvanizing and Coating Co.,
Ltd. was also allegedly involved in the cartel, but no complaint was filed against it because
it had disclosed information regarding the cartel under the JFTC's leniency program.' 50
On February 22, 2008, a JFTC investigation into an international cartel in the marine
hose sector resulted in a cease-and-desist order being issued against one Japanese company and four foreign companies, as well as a surcharge payment in the amount of
V2,3 80,000 being imposed on one Japanese company (approximately US$2 3,800).151
XVII. Korea*
A.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

An amended Enforcement Decree to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (the
MRFTA) took effect on July 1, 2008.152 The amended Enforcement Decree increases the
threshold level of assets or sales of the larger merging party needed to trigger the merger
notification requirement from KRW$100 billion (approximately US$83 million) to
KRW$200 billion (approximately US$167 million). 5 3 For mergers between two foreign
companies or mergers that involve a domestic company acquiring a foreign company, notification is not required unless the turnover in Korea of each company and their respec15
tive affiliates exceeds KRW$20 billion (approximately US$17 million). 4
The National Assembly is currently considering several additional proposals to amend
the MRFTA, including removing restrictions on holding companies, abolishing restric149. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, The JFTC Filed a Criminal Accusation on the Price-fixing
Cartel Over Galvanized Steel Sheets (Nov. 11, 2008), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/
20index.html.
150. The JFTC's leniency program is an important part of its cartel enforcement arsenal. As of March 31,
2008, the JFTC had received 179 leniency applications since the program was introduced in January 2006.
JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT OF FY 2007 2 (2008), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/epage/pressreleases/2008/September/080926_AnnualReportFY2007.pdf. See also Kazuhiko Takeshima,
Chairman of the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, Speech at The International Symposium on Enforcement
of Antimonopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, Investigation Procedures and Techniques of Monopoly Cases 3-4 (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/policyupdates/speeches/SAICSymposium2007.pdf. As to the leniency program, see Anti-Monopoly Act, arts. 7-2, available at htp://
www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/index.hml.
151. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Commission, Cease and Desist Order and Surcharge Payment Order
Against Marine Hose Manufacturers (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/pressreleases/
2008/February/080222.pdf.
* The contribution for Korea was written by Sai Ree Yun, Youngjin Jung, and Sung Moo Jung of
Yulchon.
152. Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law, Presidential Decree No. 10267
of April 1, 1981 (last amended by Presidential Decree No. 20947 of July 29, 2008), avaliable at http:/
eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/MARFTA% 20Enforcement% 2ODecree.doc.
153. Conversions into dollars are based on an exchange rate of KRW 1200 = US$1. See Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law, Presidential Decree No. 10267 of April 1, 1981, art.
18.1, available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/MARFTA%2OEnforcement%2ODecree.doc.
The
threshold asset or sales level of the smaller party has not changed from KRW$20 billion (approximately
US$17 million).
154. See Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Law, Presidential Decree No.
10267 of April 1, 1981, art. 18.3, available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/MARFTA%20Enforcement
%20Decree.doc.
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tions on maximum investments in affiliated companies, and introducing a U.S.-style consent order system.155 The current requirement that a pre-merger notification, if required,
be filed within thirty days of the execution of the merger agreement is also expected to be
repealed and replaced by a requirement to file a notification at any time before a merger is
consummated.156
B.

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In November 2007, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (the KFTc) issued corrective
orders and imposed administrative surcharges on ten pharmaceutical companies (including several multinationals) for providing rebates to hospitals, pharmacies, and wholesalers
with the intention of excluding competitorsi 5 7 The fines collectively amount to KRW$20
billion (approximately US$17 million). Five of the companies are also facing criminal
charges.
On June 4, 2008, the KFTC concluded a three-year long investigation by imposing
corrective orders and imposing an administrative surcharge on Intel Corp., Intel Semiconductor Ltd., and Intel Korea (Intel) for abuse of market dominance.158 The KFTC found
that Intel had abused its dominant market position in the CPU market by providing financial inducements to Samsung Electronics and Sambo Computer, the two largest companies in the Korean PC market, not to purchase CPUs from Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
(AMD). The KFTC determined that these acts were designed to exclude AMD from the
market and thus in violation of Article 3-2(1)5 of the MRFTA dealing with "exclusion of
competing enterprises." The KFTC ordered Intel to cease all loyalty-inducing financial
arrangements with local OEMs that were designed to exclude Intel's competitors or maintain Intel's share of OEMs' CPU purchases above a certain level. The KFTC also imposed a surcharge of approximately KRW$26 billion (approximately US$22 million).
XIX.
A.

Mexico*

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

At the end of 2007, a bill was introduced in Mexico's Congress to amend Article 35 of
the Federal Law on Economic Competition (the FLEC) to increase the fines that can be
imposed by the Federal Competition Commission (FCC) for monopolistic practices.' 5 9
155. See Bill No. 1800407 (July 24, 2008), available at http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/BillDetail.jsp?billid=PRCPOQ8AOB7M214P1L5E1S5M2B6Z6A419.
156. If any of the parties to a merger is a "large-scale company", a pre-merger filing is required. "Largescale company" means a company whose total assets or sales revenue, including that of its affiliates, exceeds
KRW 2 trillion.
157. See 2007kyungkyul859 for decision against Samil Pharm Co., Ltd., 2007kyungkyul862 for decision
against Choongwae Parma Corporation, 2007kyungkyul865 for decision against Dong-A Pharmaceutical, and
2007kyungkyul871 for decision against Hanall Pharmaceutical Inc (each on file with the authors).
158. Public version of the decision not yet available.
* The contribution for Mexico was written by Lucia Ojeda Cirdenas of SAI Abogados.
159. Que Reforma el Articulo 35 de la Ley Federal de Competencia Economica, a cargo del Deputado
Alejandro Sanchez Camacho [Proposed Reform of Competition Law by Representative Alejandro Sanchez
Camacho], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.], 12 de abril de 2007, availableat http://gaceta.diputados.
gob.mx/.
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The FCC withdrew its initial support for the bill 160 after several amendments were added
with which the FCC disagreed. 16 1
The Mexican Congress has not passed the bill yet. Nevertheless public statements by
legislators from different parties indicate that there is support for a new bill that would not
only include the proposed amendment to Article 35, but also amendments to other articles
of the FLEC that would provide the FCC with enhanced tools to impose and enforce
fines for monopolistic practices.
Another important bill was introduced in the Mexican Congress in February 2008.
This bill would amend Article 17 of the Mexican Constitution to establish the obligation
to legislate procedures for collective redress (i.e., class actions)., 62 The FCC supports this
proposal because it believes that allowing class actions would help deter anticompetitive
conduct. The proposed amendment and implementing regulation are currently under
discussion.

B.

MERGERS

On December 2007, the FCC granted conditional approval to the acquisition by
Televisa, the most important media company in Latin America, of 49 percent of the capital
stock of Cablemfs, a cable company operating in several Mexican states. 63 Commissioner
Miguel Flores issued a dissenting opinion with respect to the resolution adopted by the
FCC, arguing that the transaction should not be approved.' 64 The FCC's conditions for
approval included the obligation of Televisa to: (i) offer its free (non-pay) TV channels on
a non-discriminatory basis to all pay TV service providers in Mexico (must offer); and (ii)
transmit, through its pay TV systems, the non-pay TV content of all other transmitters on
a non-discriminatory basis (must carry). On May 12, 2008, the FCC determined that
Televisa had fulfilled its "must offer" and "must carry" obligations and that the concentra65
tion with Cablemis could proceed.'

160. FCC Opinion PRES-10-096-2007-171 (Sept. 14,2007), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/resoluciones/extractos de resoluciones/opiniones/op.pdf.
161. FCC Opinion PRES-10-096-2008-048 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/resoluciones/extractos de-resoluciones/opiniones/20080305 reserva%20art%2035.pdf. See also Press
Release, FCC, Legislators Propose Some Decrease in the Federal Competition for Monopolies (Mar.6,

2008), available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=4581&Itemid=204.
162. Sen. Murillo Karam Jestis, Address to Mexican Senate, Draft Decree Adds Article 17 of the Constiuton of the United Mexiacn States Concerning Collective Actions (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.pri.senado.gob.

mx/index.php?ido=4&opc=2&senador=Murillo% 20Karam% 20% 20JesFAs&obj-id= 1133 &tabla-id=niciativa (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
163. See FCC Files CNT-18-2007 and RA-26-2007 available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php?option=
corn content&task=view&id=3773&Itemid= 175.
164. Comision Federal de Competencia [FCC], Recurso de reconsideracion [Resource of Consideration],

RA/26/2007, available at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=4809&
Itemid=120.
165. Press Release, FCC, Cumple Televisa Condiciones de la CFC, Otorga Acceso A Contenidos [It Fulfills
and Televises Conditions of the CFC, Grants Access to Contents] (May 13, 2008), http://www.cfc.gob.mxl
index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=4895&Itemid=204. The obligations on Televisa are permanent and must continue to be complied with following closing.
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A.NICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

The FCC initiated five investigations in 2008 for alleged monopolistic practices. Three
of these investigations were initiated on the basis of third party complaints and two ex
officio by the FCC. The markets involved were: (i) the market for distributing and dealing in tickets to play in draw and gambling games, 166 (ii) the market for fixed internet

interconnection services, 167 (iii) the market for inter-urban long distance commuted voice
8

traffic,16 (iv) the market for anesthesiology services within Mexico,

for real estate advisory services in Mazatln, Sinaloa.1

70

169

and (v) the market

In September 2008, the FCC decided to close its investigation of alleged monopolistic
practices in the market for public notary services in Mexico. The FCC had initiated the
investigation at the end of 2007. The FCC closed the investigation without any finding

against the parties.
XX.
A.

171

THE NETHERLANDS*
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

1. De minimis Safe Harbor
The present Dutch Competition Act contains a "safe harbor" for cartel infringements
that do not significantly affect the Dutch market. 172 This "safe harbor" is applied if a
turnover threshold or, alternatively, a market share threshold is met.' 73 A legislative proposal now pending before Parliament aims to amend the market share threshold to require
that the aggregate market share held by the parties not exceed ten percent in any of the
relevant markets affected by the agreement or concerted practice (the current threshold is

five percent). 174 This is similar to the threshold in the de minimis Notice of the European
Commission, 175 with one important difference: unlike the EC de minimis Notice, the
Dutch Competition Act also allows "hard core" infringements to fall under the de minimis
rule.
166. FCC File DE-17-2008.
167. FCC File DE-39-2007.
168. FCC File 10-02-2008.
169. FCC File DE-40-2007.
170. FCC File 10-01-2008.
171. FCC FILE 10-02-2007.
* The contribution for theNetherlands was written byWinfred Knibbelerand Nima Lorj6 ofFreshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Amsterdam.
172. Agreements or concerted practices which comply with the "safe harbor" criteria do not fall under the
Competition Act's
cartel prohibition. See Act of 22 May 1997, Providing New Rules for Economic Competition(Competition Act), Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 2004, 345, Art. 7.
173. The turnover threshold requires that the agreement or concerted practice a) involve not more than

eight undertakings, which b) achieve an aggregate turnover of not more than C5.5 million (approximately
US$7.2 million) if the activities of all parties concern mainly trade in goods or Cl.I million (approximately
US $1.4 million) for all other activities. Id.
174. See Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [TK] [House of Representatives], 31354, 2007-2008, no. 2.
175. See Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimus), 2001 Oj.(C 368)
7 , T 7(a).
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Rules of Conduct for Public Undertakings

Another pending amendment to the Competition Act is designed to remove competitive distortions between public and private undertakings in markets where both public and
private undertakings offer goods and services (e.g., public transport or waste collection).
The proposal would require public undertakings, inter alia, to sell their products in accordance with the "market economy investor principle", i.e., they should include direct and
7
indirect costs in their sale prices unless this has a negative impact on public functions.1 6

3.

NMa Guidelines

The Dutch Competition Authority (the NMa) issued new guidelines clarifying its policy for the issuance of simplified decisions in merger cases. The NMa will issue a simplified decision, inter alia, when: there is no need for a second phase or remedies, there is no
conflicting advice on the merger from another regulator, and there are no third party
complaints.1 77 The NMa also published guidelines for mergers in the healthcare, agriculture, postal, and energy sectors 178 and guidelines on acceptable forms of cooperation be179
tween undertakings.

B.

MERGERS

In 2008, the NMa again dealt with a considerable number of mergers in the hospital
sector. The Ziekenhuis Walcheren - Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen case is of particular interest.
This proposed merger OF ZIEKENHtnS WALCHEREN AND OOSTERSCHELDEZIEKENHUIZEN would have resulted in a post-merger share of nearly 100 percent in the market for
general hospital services in the south-west of the Netherlands. The parties argued that
the merger would lead to efficiencies that benefited consumers, but the NMa was not
convinced. The transaction is currently subject to a second phase investigation. 18 0
In the Evean Groep-Philadelphia-Woonzorg Nederland case, the NMa considered a
merger in the nursing home market. It allowed the merger to proceed, subject to the
8
divestiture of eleven nursing homes.' '

176. See TK 31531, 2007-2008, No. 2.
18
177. Staatscourant [Stcrt.] 172, p. .

178. NMa, Leidraad voor zorginstellingen met fisie- of overnameplannen [Guiding Principle for Care Institutions with Fusions or Adopting Plans], available at http://www.nmanct.nl/Images/Leidraad%20zorginstelfingen-tcml6-113990.pdf (only available in Dutch).
179. Richtsnoeren Samenwerking Ondernemingen [Guidelines cooperation ventures], available at http://
www.nmanet.n lmages/Richtsnoeren% 20Samenwerking%200ndememingen-april%202008.8-tcml 675276.pdf (only available in Dutch).
180. Ziekenhuis Walcheren/Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen, De Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [NMa],
23 July 2008, Case No. 6424/46 (Neth.). The same transaction had been investigated by the NMa in 2005.
The NMa considered a second phase investigation necessary at that time. Although the notifying parties
submitted an application for a license (a second phase decision), they withdrew it just before the final decision
came out and the merger did not proceed. The current review is based on a new first phase notification
submitted by the parties on June 25, 2008.
181. Evean Groep & Philadelphia/Woonzorg Netherland, De Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [NMa],
1 Apr 2008, Case No. 6141.
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CARTELS

In 2008, the NMa decided the last remaining appeal cases involving cartels in the construction sector. In June 2008, for example, the NMa fined five suppliers of traffic lights
s
and traffic management installations a total of C400,000 (approximately US $520,000)1 2
for engaging in cartel activities (MAINLY BID RIGGING) between January 1998 and December 2003.183

In September 2008, the NMa fined two cartels in the homecare sector C3 million (approximately US$3.9 million) and C4.8 million (approximately US$6.2 million) respectively.1s4 In both cases, homecare institutions had entered into market allocation
agreements following enactment of the new Healthcare Act, which was designed to introduce greater competition in the healthcare sector. The NMa reduced the parties' fines by
twenty-five percent because it did not want to prejudice their financial viability and also
because budget and pricing restrictions meant that excessive pricing by the cartels was
unlikely.
2008's most notable judicial decision was issued by the Trade and Industry Appeals
Tribunal (the Tribunal) in Associations of Psychologists.185 In this case, the Tribunal overruled the NMa's finding that the associations had breached the cartel prohibition in Article 6 of the Competition Act by circulating price recommendations to members. The
Tribunal held that the NMa had failed to take into account the specific market circumstances affecting psychologists, namely that price is not a relevant competitive factor because patients are referred to psychologists by their doctors based on expertise and quality
rather than price.

XXI.
A.

Nepal*

INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2007, Nepal's long-awaited competition law, the Competition Promotion and Market Protection Act 2007 (the Act), came into force.186 The Act is the first
comprehensive law in Nepal that deals exclusively with anticompetitive activities, including multinational corporations doing business in Nepal. The Act governs a broad range
of conduct, including mergers and acquisitions, anticompetitive agreements, abuse of a
dominant position, and other anticompetitive activities such as exclusive dealing, bid rigging, collusive bidding, market restriction, and tied selling. The Act provides for the for182. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of EU$1 = US$1.30.
183. Verkeersregeltoestellen en verkeersregelinstallaties, De Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [NMa],
Report, 27 June 2008, Case No. 5697. This was the last cartel which qualified for the special simplified
sanction procedure that was established to deal with cartels in the construction sector. Under this simplified
procedure, parties agreed not to contest the facts and to waive the right to be heard individually. In addition,
one alleged cartel participant represented all other alleged cartel members.
184. Kennemerland, De Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [NMa], 19 Sept. 2008, Case No. 6108; Thuiszorg 't Gooi, De Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [NMal, 19 Sept. 2008, Case No. 5851.
185. Associations of Psychologists c.s. College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven [CBB], Oct. 6, 2008, LJN:
BF8820.
* The contribution for Nepal was written by Devendra Pradhan of Pradhan & Associates.
186. Competition Promotion and Market Protection Act, No. 35 (2007), available at http://
www.parliament.gov.np/Legislation.htm.
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mation of a statutory competition authority, the Competition Promotion and Market
7
Protection Board (the Board), to promote and protect competition in the country.S
B.

MERGERS

The Act restricts mergers or acquisitions that are designed solely to create a monopoly
in the relevant market or to encourage restrictive practices in the relevant market1lss A
merger or acquisition that results in a greater than forty percent share in the relevant
market for the production or distribution of a product or service in the country is presumed to create a monopoly in the relevant market, and thus to encourage restrictive
practices in the market.' 89 Merger reviews are undertaken by the Office of the Company
Registrar under the Companies Act and not by the Board.
C.

CARTELS

The Act prohibits forms of anticompetitive agreements-including market sharing
agreements, pricing agreements, output restriction agreements, bid rigging, and collusive
bidding-that aim to restrict or limit competition for the production, supply, and distribution of goods or services in a market. 190 All anticompetitive agreements contravening the
Act are considered void. 191
D.

ABUSE OF A

DomiNNT POSITION

The Act prohibits entities that hold a dominant position in a market from abusing that
position by restricting competition in respect of the production or distribution of goods or
services. 192 An entity is deemed to be in a "dominant position" if, acting solely or together
with similar entities, it accounts for at least forty percent of annual production or distribution in a relevant product market in Nepal or is otherwise in a position to act unilaterally
in the market. 193 The Board publishes a list of entities holding a dominant position.
E.

ENFORCEMENT

The Act empowers both Market Protection Officers and the Board to investigate anticompetitive activities. Charges under the Act are brought by the State as plaintiff. Entities found to have engaged in anticompetitive activities are subject to civil penalties. A
person acting in-chief on behalf of an entity (e.g., a corporation) is deemed to be responsible for any such penalties. Private claimants are also entitled to seek damages from a
person or entity engaged in anticompetitive activities.
187.1,d. § 12.
188. Id. § 5. Although the Act does not specifically define the term "market," a relevant market will generally include a product market and a geographic market.
189. Id.

190. Id. § 3.
191. Id.
192. Id. § 4.
193. Id.
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New Zealand*

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In March 2008, the New Zealand Government released the Commerce Amendment
Bill, 194 which proposes extensive reform of the regulatory control provisions of the Commerce Act 1986 (Parts 4, 4A, and 5) that make up the key economic regulation of businesses that do not face competition or the threat of competition. The amendments are
designed to provide greater certainty on regulatory scope, in an effort to facilitate increased infrastructure investment by regulated businesses, while preventing the exercise of
market power.
In July 2008, the Australian and New Zealand Governments signed a treaty on transTasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement.1 95 This treaty will result in
greater harmonization of Australasian competition law and will serve to increase the reach
and effectiveness of Australian and New Zealand competition regulators. Its immediate
practical effect will be to remove the bar against the New Zealand Commerce Commission (the Commission) enforcing penalties against Australian companies and directors,
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission enforcing penalties against
New Zealand companies and directors.
In September 2008, Parliament introduced a bill to extend the scope of the Commission's powers of cooperation with other international competition regulators.196 More
specifically, it provides the Commission with the ability to provide investigative assistance
and "compulsorily-acquired information to overseas regulators."' 97 The Bill is only at its
First Reading stage and will not be considered by Parliament again until 2009.

B.

MERGERS

The Commission received fourteen applications for voluntary merger clearances between January 1 and October 31, 2008. Eleven of these mergers were cleared, two were
declined, and one was withdrawn.' 98
The most high profile merger decision in 2008 was the Court of Appeal's judgment in
Commerce Commission v. Woolworths Ltd. & Ors, overruling the High Court's decision de* The contribution for New Zealand was written by Andrew Peterson and Troy Pilkington of Russell
McVeagh.
194. To see the full text of the Bill, refer to the New Zealand parliament website. Commerce Amendment
Act 2008, 2008 S.N.Z. No. 70 available at http://www.parbament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/d/O/4/
00DBHOH_BILL8440 1-Commerce-Amendment-Bill.htm.
195. To view the current status of the treaty, refer to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Trade's website, Treaties and International Law, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-Intemational-Law/
03-Treaty-making-process/International-Treaties-List/12-Private-Intemational-Law.php (last visited Apr. 3,
2009).
196. Commerce Commission (International Corporation and Fees) Bill, 2008, Bill 1293-11, available at http:/
/www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Legislation/Bills/c/8/2/ODBHOH-BILL8756-l-Commerce-CommissionInternational-Cooperation.htm.
197. Id.
198. This data reflects merger clearance activity during the period January 1,2008 to October 31, 2008. A
full register of clearance applications received by the Commerce Commission is available at http://
www.comcom.govt.nz/PublicRegisters/mergersacquisitions-clearances.aspx.
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nying clearances to two separate proposed acquisitions of up to 100 percent of The Warehouse, a large general merchandise retailer and recent entrant into the grocery industry.' 99
Notably, the Court of Appeal held that the High Court had misinterpreted the Commission's role in merger clearances. The High Court had interpreted the relevant statutory
test as requiring the Commission to grant clearance unless satisfied that a substantial lessening of competition is likely. The Court of Appeal stated that this inverted the proper
standard, and that the Commission should grant clearance only if it is satisfied that a
substantial lessening of competition is not likely; in all other cases, clearance should be
200
denied.
The Court of Appeal's May 2008 decision in Commerce Commission v. New Zealand Bus

Ltd.201 was expected to provide guidance on the test for accessory liability in the merger
context. Unfortunately, the decision offers two potentially inconsistent tests for when a
vendor may be considered liable as an accessory for a business acquisition that contravenes
the Act. While there must be knowledge of the essential facts, two inconsistent overlays
were applied to this: "dishonest participation" and "knowledge of a real risk of contravention. ' 202 Neither of these overlays is particularly certain in its application and parties
should be careful to satisfy themselves that they do not attract liability under either test.
In July 2008, the Commission commenced a consultation process to seek feedback on
draft process guidelines and a revised application form for businesses seeking clearance for
a merger or acquisition. 20 3 The impetus for this consultation process stems largely from
the lengthy timeframes for determination of clearance applications. Under the draft
guidelines, the Commission will encourage merging parties to participate in informal and
confidential pre-filing discussions with the Commission.

C.

CARTELS

In late 2007, the Commission commenced proceedings "against a New Zealand company, its Australian parent and four executives for alleged cartel behaviour in the New
Zealand corrugated fiber packaging industry."204 In July 2008, the Commission also filed
proceedings against two pathology service providers, alleging that, starting in 2003, the
companies had agreed not to compete against each other in a particular region pending a
20 5
proposed merger of their operations that never materialized.
199. Commerce Comm'n v. Woolworths Ltd. & Ors, [20081 NZCA 276 (C.A.). The proposed acquirers
were Woolworths and Foodstuffs, both among New Zealand's leading supermarket chains.

200. Id. at 95, 107.
201. Commerce Comm'n v. New Zealand Bus Ltd., [2007] NZCA 502 (CA).
202. Id.
203. To view the guidelines in full, refer to the Commerce Commission's website, available athttp://www.
comcom.govt.nz/BusinessCompetition/MergersAcquisitions/ClearanceProcessGuideines/cearanceprcess
guidelines.aspx
204. Press Release, Commerce Comrnm'n, Commerce Commission initiates legal action against alleged cartel
(Nov. 22 2007), available at http://www.concom.govt.nz/BusinessCompetition/Anti-competitivePractices/
commercecommissioninitiateslegalac 1.aspx.
205. Press Release, Commerce Comm'n, Commerce Commission files proceedings against Waikato pathology service providers July 17, 2008), available at http://www.comcom.govm.nz/BusinessCompetition/AnticompetitivePractices/commercecommissionfiesproceedings.aspx.
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Norway*

On June 20, 2008, the Norwegian Competition Act (the Act) was amended to include a
suspensory obligation for notifiable mergers and acquisitions. Effective from July 1, 2008,
mergers and acquisitions that are required to be reported in accordance with the Act are
prohibited from being implemented before they have been notified to and reviewed by the
Norwegian Competition Authority (the NCA).206 Certain changes were also introduced
20 7
to the information requirements for notifications.
B.

MERGERS

On February 1, 2008, the NCA approved the acquisition of specific assets of YX Energi
Norge AS by AS Norske Shell, subject to the condition that Shell not acquire two YX gas
20 8
On May 30, 2008, the NCA approved the
stations in the southern part of Norway.
acquisition of Lidl Norge GmbH by the grocery chain REMA 1000 AS, on the condition

that a retail store in NordiJordeid be offered to a competitor, either in the form of a sale,
20 9
On July 5, 2008, the NCA gave its approval to the
or in the form of a rental contract.
acquisition of Lantminnen Analycen AB by Eurofins Danmark A/S (Eurofins) on the con-

dition that Eurofins divest one of its subsidiaries, in order to avoid any negative impact in
the market for analysis of foodstuffs and corn.

2 10

Also of note is that on October 21, 2008, the Commission of the European Union

conditionally approved the acquisition of ConocoPhillips' network of "Jet" fuel stations in
Scandinavia by the Norwegian oil and gas company StatoilHydro, following an in-depth
investigation. In order to gain approval, StatoilHydro committed to carry out several
2
remedies, including divesture of all forty "Jet" fuel stations in Norway. ii

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

C.

On February 28, 2008, and then subsequently on March 14, 2008, the NCA imposed
fines against Borregaard Industries Limited and Brenntag Nordic AS, respectively, for
2 12
Borregaard was fined
illegal market sharing in the market for technical acetic acid.
* The contribution for Norway was written by Trygve Norum and Gaute Sletten of Advokatfirmaet

Haavind Vislie AS, Oslo, Norway.
206. See Act of 5 March 2004 No. 12 (The Competition Act of 2004), § 18.
2)7 .

e

ie §§ 18-21, 26, 27

208. See NCA Case No. 2008/3, available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/
429104/V2008- 3 %20AS%20NORSKE%20SHELL.PDF (available only in Norwegian).
209. See NCA Case No. 2008/10, available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/
430137/V2008-10_REMALIDL.PDF (available only in Norwegian).
210. See NCA Case No. 2008/12, available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/
430420/V2008-12_EUROFINS ANALYCEN OFFENTLIG.PDF (available only in Norwegian).
211. Press Release, European Union, Mergers, Commission clears StatoilHydro's proposed acquisition of
Jet Scandinavia, subject to conditions (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press.
212. See NCA Cases No. 2008/4, available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Conten/
429314/V2008-4_BORREGAARD.PDF (available only in Norwegian); see also NCA Cases No. 2008/5,
available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/429326/V2008-5%20BRENNTAG
%20-%20OFFENTLIG%20VERSJON.PDF (available only in Norwegian).
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NOK$1.6 million (approximately US $224,000) and Brenntag Nordic was fined NOK
$1.3 million (approximately US$182,000).213

On October 13, 2008, the Oslo District Court began hearings to review the fine of
NOK$45 million (approximately US$6.3 million) that the NCA had imposed on TINE
BA in 2007. The NCA concluded that TINE AB had abused its dominant position by
negotiating (or attempting to negotiate) exclusive supply arrangements with Norwegian
grocery chains for the supply of certain types of cheese. The NCA found that TINE had
intended to exclude its main competitor in Norway, Synnove Finden. 214 No decision on
appeal had been rendered as of the writing of this article.
On October 17, 2008, the NCA announced that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration had settled a damages claim against the construction firms Selmer Skanska AS and
Veidekke ASA. The Administration also started proceedings against two other firms operating in the market, NCC Construction AS and Reinertsen Anlegg AS. The Administration alleges that the four entrepreneurs engaged in market sharing and illegal tendering
on public projects from 1994 through 2000.215

XXIV.
A.

Peru*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In order to implement the recent Free Trade Agreement entered into between Peru and
the United States of America, the Executive Branch of the Peruvian Government was
delegated the authority to legislate on diverse subject matters. 216 Pursuant to this authority, Peru's Executive Branch enacted two legislative decrees in June 2008 that govern anticompetitive conduct: (i) Legislative Decree 1034, the Law Against Anticompetitive

2
Conduct; 2 17 and (ii) Legislative Decree 1044, the Law Against Unlawful Competition. 18

The purpose of both decrees is to promote economic efficiency and investment in Peru by
suppressing, prohibiting, and sanctioning practices whose actual or potential effect is to
hinder the proper operation of a competitive market.
213. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of NOK$1 = US $0.14.
214. See NCA Case No. 2007/2, available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/
425898/V2007-2_TINE.PDF (available only in Norwegian); see also Press Release, Norwegian Competition
Authority, Konkurransetilsynet moter TINE Oslo tingrett [TINE Competition meetings in Oslo Court]
(Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/Aktuelt/Nyheter/Konkurransetilsynetmoter-TINE-i-Oslo-tingrett/.
215. Press Release, Norwegian Competition Authority, Private damages claim in Norwegian cartel case
(Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/news/archive/Private-damages-claim-inNorwegian-cartel-case/.
* The contribution for Peru was written by Oscar Arris of Estudio Rubio, Leguia, Normand y
Asociados, with the assistance of Diego Harman.
216. Law No. 29157.
217. Decreto Legislativo que apreuba laLey de Represi6n de Conductas Anticompetitivas [Decree approving the Law Against Anticompetitive Conduct], El Peruano [Official Gazette], June 25, 2008.
218. Decreto Legislativo que aprueba laLey de Represi6n de la Competencia Desleal [Decree approving the
Law Against Unlawful Competition Official Gazette], El Peruano [Official Gazette], June 26, 2008.

VOL. 43, NO. 2

INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST

271

1. The Law Against Anticompetitive Conduct
The Law Against Anticompetitive Conduct replaces the Law Against Monopolistic,
Controlling and Restrictive Practices of Free Competition, which had been in effect for
15 years. One of the most significant and novel measures introduced by the new legislation is the possibility of sanctioning extraterritorial conduct, provided that it has anticompetitive effects within Peru.
The new law also establishes new powers for the Technical Secretariat of the Peruvian
Competition Agency, which is an autonomous part of the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property (INDECOPI). The Technical Secretariat
is responsible for all administrative investigations, has authority to impose fines and other
sanctions, and issue opinions regarding the existence of anticompetitive acts. Concerns
have been expressed that the new roles established for the Technical Secretariat will concentrate authority unduly in the hands of one person.

2.

The Law Against Unlawful Competition

The Law Against Unlawful Competition unifies, in a single text, the provisions governing unlawful competition and commercial advertising, which were formerly governed
by two separate laws. The integration of these regulatory provisions is significant in that
improper commercial advertising is one of the more common forms of unlawful competition in Peru. This law also offers the advantage of providing more detailed explanations
of the various types of unlawful acts that it covers, rather than merely listing them as was
the case in the previous law.

3. Changes to INDECOPI
The June 2008 series of decrees also included Legislative Decree 1033, which enacted
various changes to the structure of INDECOPI.219 One of the most important innovations is the addition of more courts to JNDECOPI's organizational structure. This
should improve the efficiency of INDECOPI's decision making process.

XXV.
A.

Portugal*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Decree-Law No. 18/2008 of January 29, 2008220 amended the Competition Act 22 1 by
establishing a new ancillary sanction. Under the new regime, the Portuguese Competition Authority (the PCA) may, in addition to levying fines, deprive infringing undertakings of the right to participate in public tenders. This new ancillary sanction only applies
219. El Peruano, June 25, 2008, supra note 215.
* The contribution for Portugal was written by Ant6nio Vitorino and Sttphanie Si Silva of Gonqalves
Pereira, Castelo Branco & Associados.

220. Decree-Law No. 18/2008, Jan. 29, 2008, available at http://digestoconvidados.dre.pt/Digesto/
(jucghv5535vdmvn3tmursr45)/Paginas/DipomaDetalhado.aspx?claint=229997.
221. Decree-Law No. 18/2003, D.R. No. 28 (Series I-A), Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://www.anacom.pt/
render.jspcontentdd=106189 [hereinafter Competition Act].
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to undertakings that have been found to breach competition rules within the scope of
public tenders and has a maximum duration of two years.

B.

MERGERS

On June 26, 2008, the PCA decided not to oppose the merger between Galp Energia
Group and the Liquid Bulk Terminal of the Port of Sines.2 22 This concentration raised
two interesting issues: (i) the need to assess the competitive implications of the concentration at both upstream and downstream levels; and (ii) the need to take into account the
governing regulatory framework.

C.

CARTELS

On May 21, 2008, the Lisbon Court of Commerce 223 overruled the PCA's decision of
October 31, 2007224 condemning Aeronorte and Helisul for having executed an agreement to fix prices and other commercial conditions in a public tender launched by the
Civil Protection National Service in 2005. The judgment condemned the PCA's lack of
evidence in support of its decision and underscored that, when assessing public tenders,
the PCA must consider the scope and object of the tenders as well as the impact of potential competitors. Additionally, the Court stated that the PCA had failed to prove that the
agreement had, as its object or effect, the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition.

D. ABusE OF A Do~mNANT POSMON
On September 1, 2008, PT Comunicaq6es, S.A. (PTC), the former national telecommunications operator, was fined C2.1 million (approximately US $2.7 million) 225 by the
PCA for abuse of a dominant position in the wholesale markets for circuit leasing, in
breach of both national and community competition laws.2 26 The PCA found that PTC
had breached Article 6 of the Portuguese Competition Act and Article 82 of the EC
Treaty by applying a discriminatory discount system that favored the companies of the
PTC Group and adversely affected its competitors. The PCA's decision exemplifies the
recent evolution of the telecommunications sector towards increased competition.

222. Autoridade Da Concorrbncia [Competition Authority], Decision AC-I-Ccent. 78/2007 GALP/TGLS,
available at http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/2007_78_finalnet.pdf.
223. Lisbon Court of Commerce, Case No. 48/08.7TYLSB (on file with authors).
224. Autoridade Da Concorrbncia [Competition Authority], Notice No. 19/2007, Oct. 31, 2007, availableat
http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/comunicado2007-19.pdf.
225. Based on November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of EU$1 = USS1.30.
226. Autoridade Da Concorrncia [Competition Authority], Notice No. 15/2008, Sept. 1, 2008, availableat
http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/comunicado2008-l 5.pdf.
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Serbia*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Serbian Ministry of Trade and Services has produced a draft amendment (the
227
The Draft was to have been
Draft) to the Serbian Law on Protection of Competition.
debated and adopted by the Government of the Republic of Serbia by the end of 2008 and
should be adopted by the Serbian Parliament in 2009.228 The content of the Draft is not
yet available to the public. But it is expected that this legislation will closely resemble EU
Harmonization of Sercompetition legislation, consistent with the 2007 Action Plan for
229
bian Legislation with the Legislation of the European Union.
B.

MERGERS

One of the most significant problems with Serbia's current antitrust legislation is that

230
Concentrations that
the threshold for reviewable concentrations (mergers) is too low.

exceed this threshold must be approved by the Commission for Protection of Competition
(the Commission). 231 The low threshold has resulted in a large number of requests for
approval being submitted to the Commission, which has significantly slowed the Commission's decision-making process since it does not possess sufficient personnel to review all
232
of the submitted requests.
One of the Commission's most significant merger decisions (delivered at the end of
2007) involved the controversial merger between Primer C d.o.o. and C market a.d., two
grocery store chains that sought to merge in December 2005. The Commission did not
approve the merger initially. But the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of
233
The Commission
Serbia, which ordered the Commission to re-examine its decision.
did so, and decided once again to deny approval.234 This case has generated significant
* The contribution for Serbia was written by Olga Cvetkovic of Belgrade, Serbia.
227. Zakon o zaititi konkurencije [ZZK] [Law on Protection of Competition] Slubeni glasnik Republike
Srbije, No. 79/05 (on file with the author). The Law on Protection of Competition was enacted in 2005.
228. Milosavljevi: Zakon o zaftiti konkurencje do kraja 2008, DAS, Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://
www.danas.rs/vesti/ekonomija/
milosavljevic.zakon-o-zastiti_konkurencijedokraja_2008.4.html?newsid=142393.
229. Vlada Srbije - Kancelarija za Evropske integracije, Akcioni plan za uskladivanje zakona Republike Srbije
sa propisima EU 2007, at 1, availableat http://web.uzzpro.sr.gov.yu/kzpeu/harmonizacija/ap-2007.pdf.
230. The current notification threshold is that the combined annual income in Serbia of all parties to the
transaction exceeds an amount in CSD equivalent to CIO million (approximately US $13 million), the combined worldwide income of the parties exceeds C50 million (approximately US $65 million), and that at least
one of the parties is registered in Serbia.
231. Zakon o zagtiti konkurencije [ZZK][Law on Protection of Competition] Sluibeni glasnik Republike
Srbije, No. 79/05, art. 23 (on file with the author).
232. Komisija za zagtitu konkurencije, Godignji izveitaj o radu komisije za za~titu konkurenicje za 2007
godinu, at 1, availableat http://www.kzk.org.yu/download/lzvestaj%20KZK%20%202007.pdf.
233. Vrhovni sud Srbije [VSS] [Supreme Court of Serbia], U. 4466/06 (on file with the author).
234. Komisija za zagtitu konkurencije [KZK] [Commission for the Protection of Competition], 6/0-02-138/
07-15, Nov. 26, 2007 (on file with the author).
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debate among competition professionals about the most appropriate way to determine
236
market shares.23 5 The case also has attracted considerable public attention.
C.

ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTs

Five proceedings regarding restrictive agreements were brought to the Commission in
2008. All of these proceedings are still ongoing and the Commission's decisions are
237
pending.
D.

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

The Commission issued one decision in 2008 holding that an undertaking was abusing

its dominant position. 23s In this decision, the Commission concluded that the Danube
Food Groups BV (DFG) had abused its dominant position in the market for the purchase
of raw milk by unfairly dictating terms to Serbian dairy farmers.
DFG, based in the Netherlands, is the majority shareholder in the three largest dairy
processors in Serbia and purchases more than forty-seven percent of the raw milk produced in the country. The Commission found that farmers have no ability to negotiate or
influence terms of agreement because of their lack of economic strength and alternative
options. For example, the price schedule is set by DFG, can be changed at its sole discretion, and has been changed in DFG's favor in the past. The Commission imposed several
remedial measures on DFG, including requiring that prices be set according to certain
criteria, and that farmers receive notice of any price changes.

235. For more about this issue, see Prof. Miroljub Labus, Uporedna analiza relevantnog triita: koncept i
primena [Comparative analysis of relevant markets: the concept and application],EKONOMIKA PREDUZECA, Jan.Feb. 2008; Prof. Dragan Duri&n & Dr Dragan Lonfar, Dr Vesna Raji6, Merenje koncentracije tri;5ta: primer
sektora prehrambene maloprodaje Beograda [Measnring the concentration of markets: food retail sector example of
Belgrade], EKONOMIKA PREDUZECA, Jan.-Feb. 2008 (each on file with the author).
236. See generally The Anti-Corruption Council, Report on the Company C Market, availableat http://
www.antikorupcija-savet.sr.gov.yu/eng/view.jsp?articleId=579.
237. Telephone interview with a representative of the Commission for Protection of Competition in Serbia
(Nov. 13, 2008).
238. Komisija za zaititu konkurencije [KZK [Commission for the Protection of Competition], Jan. 25,
2008, available at http://www.kzk.org.yu/download/Resenje%20-%20Danube%20Foods%20Group.pdf at 23 (The Commission is also currently reviewing another two abuse of dominance cases); Telephone interview
with a representative of the Commission for Protection of Competition in Serbia (Nov. 13, 2008).

VOL. 43, NO. 2

INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST

XXVHI.
A.

275

Spain*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Regulation 261/2008 (the Regulation) came into force on February 28, 2008.239 The

Regulation implements some of the most important features of the new Spanish Antitrust
Law (Law 15/2007).240

Of particular importance is the introduction of a leniency procedure in Spain, which
had been delayed until the Regulation came into force.241 Under this procedure, the first
party requesting leniency is entitled to full immunity, provided that the information it
supplies is sufficient to allow the CNC to open an investigation. Companies that have
already received a statement of objections, and cartel ring leaders, cannot claim immunity.
They can, however, request a reduced fine if they produce evidence that significantly helps
the investigation. The granting of leniency is also subject to the requesting party's complete and ongoing cooperation with the CNC throughout the procedure.
The Regulation also adopts criteria for identifying de minimis conduct, i.e., conduct
that is not considered capable of affecting competition. The Regulation largely follows
EU law in this regard. 242 The other major element of the Regulation is its adoption of
two model forms for merger notifications, one "full" and the other "short."243 The "full"
form is similar to the "Form CO" used for notifications to the European Commission.
The "short" form requires considerably less information and is intended to be used for
mergers that are unlikely to raise issues, e.g., where the parties do not compete in the
same product and geographic markets.

B. MERGERS

As of the writing of this article (November 11, 2008), seventy-five transactions had been
notified to the antitrust authorities in 2008. 2 - Only four of these transactions were re* The contribution for Spain was written by Susana Cabrera and Konstantin Jdrgens of GARRIGUES.
239. Reglamento de Defensa de laCompetencia [Antitrust Regulation] (B.O.E. 2008, 3646), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2008/02/27/pdfs/Al 1575-1 1604.pdf.
240. Defensa de laCompetencia [Antritrust Law] (B.O.E. 2008, 12946), availableat http://www.boe.es/g/es/.
See generally Press Release, CNC, Approval of the Royal Decree that Implements the Competition Regula-

tions (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/pdfs/novedades/85ing.pdf.
241. Leniency applications are made to the Cartel Unit, which forms part of the Investigation Directorate of

the National Competition Commission (Comisidn Nacional de laCompetencia or "CNC"). See Press Release,
CNC, The CNC's Introduction of the Leniency Programme is a Success. The CNC Receives the First
Applications on the First Day After it Comes Into Force (Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es/pdfs/novedades/87ing.pdf.
242. The CNC may publish guidelines to further develop and specify the criteria for defining de minimis
conduct.
243. Antitrust Regulation, supranote 239, Annex II and I1.
244. See CNC, Merger Control Resolutions and Pending Cases under the new Act 15/2007 (Resoluciones y
Expedientes en trimite Control de Concentraciones), http://www.cncompetencia.es/index.aspm=50&p=47
and http://www.cncompetencia.es/index.asp?m=41&p=ll. This compares to eighty-seven notifiable transactions over the same period in 2007.
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ferred to a "second phase" in-depth investigation, two of which were subsequently
abandoned.245

C.

CARTELS

The CNC has opened an investigation into whether Spanish insurance companies have
colluded by offering uniform premiums in connection with ten-year construction defects
insurance.2 46 There was also an increased level of dawn raid activity in 2008, targeting
companies in industries such as waste management,2 47 Jerez sherry,2 48 iron, 249 and cosmetics. 2 50 There were complaints about the manner in which some of these raids were
conducted, but the CNC has defended its practices.

D.

ANTICOMPETITSVE PRACTICES

As of November 11, 2008, sixty-five resolutions had been adopted in cases involving
anticompetitive practices. 25' In one such case, the CNC ruled on an appeal filed by Gestevisi6n Telecinco (T5) against the former Spanish Antitrust Service's (Servicio de
Defensa de la Competencia) decision to close its file on T5's complaint that the tariffs
charged by the entity managing the intellectual property rights of artists, interpreters, and
performers in Spain were abusive.252 The CNC Council upheld T5's appeal and ordered
that the investigation be re-opened. The CNC also imposed fines on companies in 2008

245. The only second phase decision adopted so far in 2008 relates to Case C/0022/07 Repsol/BP Oil JV,
which was notified last year and ultimately approved without conditions, available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es/index.asp?pag=29&menu=0&m=50&p=47.
246. Press Release, CNC, Ten Year Construction Defects Insurance (Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/73ing.pdf. The CNC also found one of the insurance companies
under investigation guilty of obstruction. CNC, Resulucion Expt. SNC/02/08, CASER-2SNC, July 24,
2008, available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/resoluciones/2008/2314.pdf.
247. Press Release, CNC, The CNC Investigates Various Companies in the Waste Management Sector
(Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/77ing.pdf.
248. Press Release, CNC, The CNC has Launched an Investigation Into a Possible Market-Sharing and
Price-Fixing Cartels in the Jerez Sherry Sector (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/
PDFs/novedades/109ing.pdf.
249. Press Release, CNC, The Comisi6n Nacional de la Competencia (CNC) is Investigating a Possible
Agreement to Fix Trading Conditions in the Iron Sector (July 9, 2008), available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/107ing.pdf.
250. Press Release, CNC, The CNC Initiates the Investigation of Three Possible Price Agreements in the
Cosmetic Sector (june 19, 2008), available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/105ing.pdf.
251. Resolutions are available at CNC, http://www.cncompetencia.es ( follow "resoluciones."). This is lower
than the previous year, when ninety-six resolutions were adopted, of which just two were under the new law.
252. See CNC Decision of February 4, 2008, Case R 714/07 Telecinco/AIE, available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es; see also Press Release, CNC, The CNC will Continue to Investigate the Supposed
Abuse of a Dominant Position by the Intellectual Property Rights Management Entity AIE (Feb. 6, 2008),
available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/74ing.pdf.
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for anticompetitive practices in a variety of sectors, including: electricity,25
25
2 4
haulers, 5 and media rights for football games. "
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container

Sweden*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENrS

Sweden's amended Competition Act (the 2008 Competition Act) came into force on

November 1,

2008.256

Among other amendments, the 2008 Competition Act contains

new merger notification thresholds and a new substantive test for transactions, i.e.,
whether they "significantly impede" effective competition or the development thereof.25 7
The 2008 Competition Act also introduces a provision making pre-merger notification
mandatory. No action may be taken to implement the concentration during the initial
review period. 258 There are no direct sanctions for failure to notify or for breach of the
standstill obligation. But the Swedish Competition Authority (the SCA) may issue a decision requesting that a notification be submitted or prohibiting the parties from implementing a notifiable concentration, and impose fines for failure to comply with the
decision.
Additional minor amendments and clarifications to the merger review process include
the automatic extension of the SCA's initial review period (Phase I) from twenty-five to
thirty-five working days if commitments are offered by the parties to the concentration.
The 2008 Competition Act also aligns Swedish rules for calculating administrative fines
more closely with EC rules, taking into account the gravity of the infringement and its
duration. These amendments are expected to increase predictability for undertakings.
As regards leniency, the relevant provisions of the Competition Act have been amended
to permit undertakings that had the leading role in a cartel to receive full immunity. Only
undertakings that have coerced other undertakings to participate in a cartel are barred
from full immunity.
253. See CNC Decision of February 14, 2008, Case 624/07 Iberdrola, available at http://
www.cncompetencia.es; see also Press Release, CNC, The CNC Imposes a Fine of C15.4 million on Iberdrola
Generaci6n for Abuse of a Dominant Position on the Electricity Generation Market (Feb. 15, 2008), available
at http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/79ing.pdf; see also Press Release, CNC, The CNC has
sanctioned Gas Natural Cl.5 million for abuse of dominant position in the electricity generation markets
(Apr. 26, 2008), availableat http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/96ing.pdf.
254. Press Release, CNC, The CNC Fines the Cartel of Container Hauliers in the Port of Barcelona (Apr.
4, 2008), available at http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/93ing.pdf.
255. Press Release, CNC, Press Release on Case S/0006/07 (Football Rights) (Apr. 9, 2008), available at
http://www.cncompetencia.es/PDFs/novedades/94ing.pdf.
* The contribution for Sweden was written by Per Karlsson of Vinge's EU & Competition Practice
Group in Stockholm, Sweden and Emma Dufra of the EU & Competition Practice Group at Vinge's office
in Brussels, Belgium.
256. Konkurrenslag [Competition Act] Svensk fdrfatmingssamling [SFS 2008:579 (Swed.).
257. Id. According to the new thresholds, a mandatory notification is triggered in Sweden if. (i) the parties
to the concentration generate a combined turnover in Sweden exceeding SEK$l billion (approximately
US$148.1 million or C108.1 million); and (ii) each of at least two of the parties generates a turnover in
Sweden exceeding SEK$200 million (approximately US$29.6 million or C21.6 million).
258. In order to extend the standstill obligation beyond the initial review period, the SCA must request the
Stockholm City Court to issue an order prohibiting implementation until final clearance is granted.
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B.

CARTELS

In September 2008, the Market Court delivered its judgment in a case involving a car
retailer cartel, imposing a fine of SEK$21.2 million (approximately USS3.2 million) on
eight car retailers. 259 The Court found that the car retailers had, over a four-year period:
(i) engaged in price fixing by agreeing on the sales price for new cars, (ii) agreed on rebates
for new cars, (iii) shared and allocated markets for sales of new cars, (iv) agreed on the
purchase and sales prices for used cars, and (v) engaged in market sharing by agreeing that
different rebates would be applicable within and outside their districts.
C.

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

In February 2008, the Swedish Supreme Court delivered an intermediate judgment in a
case between ferry operator BornholmsTrafikken and Ystad Hamn (a harbor in southern
Sweden). 260 BornholmsTrafikken brought a claim against Ystad Hamn in 2002 in the
District Court alleging, inter alia, that Ystad Hamn had abused its dominant position by
charging excessive prices for port services. The intermediate judgment of the District
Court was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which found that Ystad Hamn controlled a
dominant position in the relevant market, which it defined as the supply of port services in
Ystad Hamn to ferry operators who perform ferry services for passengers and vehicles on
the Ystad-Rbnne route. 261 The Swedish Supreme Court subsequently upheld the interim
findings of the Court of Appeal. The principal case on the merits is still pending before
the District Court.
An abuse of dominance case is currently pending in the European Court of Justice (the
ECJ) following a request by the Swedish Market Court for a preliminary ruling.262 At
issue is whether Stim (a copyright collection society that administers and licenses rights to
music and text) is abusing its dominant position by applying a certain payment model for
the right to broadcast copyright-protected music. An oral hearing was held before the
ECJ in June 2008. The Advocate General subsequently issued its opinion on September
11, 2008 and the ECJ's judgment will be released on December 11, 2008.263
XXIX.
A.

Switzerland*

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Swiss Federal Council (the SFC) is expected to submit a report to the Swiss parliament in early 2009 evaluating the effectiveness of Switzerland's competition legislation
259. Regeringsrattens arsbok [RA] [Supreme Administrative Court] 2008-9-10 ref 12, available at http://
www.marknadsdomstolen.se/avgoranden/avgoranden2008/Dom2008-12.pdf.
260. Case T 2808-05 [not yet reported in NJA] [SUPRrME COURi] 2008-2-19.
261. CASE T 2094-03, STATE OF DENMARK THROUGH BORNHOLMSTRAF1KKEN./.YSTAD HAMN LOGISTIK
AKTIEBOLAG OUNE 2, 2005) (ON FILE WITH AUTHORS).

262. Case C-52/07, Kanal 5 Ltd. and TV4 AB v. The Swedish Performing Rights Society (Stim) (Dec. 11,
2008) [not yet reported in E.C.R.], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007J0052:EN:HTML.
263. The opinion of the Advocate General is available at http://curia.europa.eu/index.htm.
* The contribution for Switzerland was written by Dr. Patrick Sommer, Stefan Brunnschweiler, and
Marquard Christen of CMS von Erlach Henrici.
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(the ACart). 264 This review is mandated by Article 59A of the ACart and has been ongoing since 2007. Potential topics to be addressed in the report include: the institutional
setting of the Swiss competition authorities, international cooperation with other competition authorities,26 5 sanctions against natural persons for competition law violations, pos-

sibilities for facilitating private enforcement of competition law, the assessment of vertical
restraints, an amendment of the merger notification thresholds, and the substantive test to
be applied to merger reviews.
B.

MERGERS

Several merger decisions of the Swiss Competition Commission (ComCo) in 2008
demonstrate ComCo's willingness to use behavioral remedies to address its concerns. On
May 17, 2008, for example, ComCo allowed Switzerland's second largest retailer, Coop,
to acquire the Carrefour stores in Switzerland run by Distributis subject to certain conditions, including: (i) an obligation that Coop not impose exclusivity on any of its distributors, (ii) a prohibition on the acquisition of any other food retailer in Switzerland within
the next six years, and (iii) an obligation to offer an aggregate sales area of 20,000 m2 to
competitors in particularly concentrated markets. 266
ComCo also gave conditional approval to the acquisition of Steffen-Ris Holding Ltd.
by Fenaco, the largest company in the Swiss agricultural sector. 267 The concentration led
to significant increases in Fenaco's market share in the wholesale market for consumer and
industry potatoes as well as in the wholesale market for seed potatoes. ComCo therefore
made the clearance subject to Fenaco's commitment not to impose any purchase or supply
obligations on potato farmers.
C.

ANTICOMPETITVE PRACTICES

In July 2008, ComCo concluded its investigation of Documed Ltd., which publishes
information on pharmaceutical products.2 68 ComCo alleged that Documed had abused its
264. For an unofficial English translation of the ACart, see http://www.weko.admin.ch/dokumentation/
00160/index.html?lang=en.
265. In June 2008, for example, the president of the Swiss Competition Commission called for greater cooperation with European competition authorities. See Interview by NZZ am Sonntag with Professor Walter
Stoffel, President, ComCo, Rad nicbt Zurzickdreben NZZ ONLINE (Switz.), June 1, 2008, at 27, available at
http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/Wirtschaft/aktuell/radnichtzurueckdrehenl.747979.html.
Meetings are
to be held with the European Commission in this regard. See Simon Thoenen, Kartellwichter sucben Hilfe in
Briissel, HANDELSZEITJNG (Switz.), Sept. 17, 2008, at 19, available at http://www.handelszeitung.ch/artikel/
Unternehmen-Kartellwaechter-suchen-Hilfe-in-Bruessel_397666.html.
266. Press release, ComCo, Weko bewilligt die t1bernahme von Carrefour durch Coop unter Auflagen
[Weko authorize the acquisition of Carrefour by Coop at Auflagen Conditions] (Mar. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.news-service.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/de/17948. For further details on the acquisition
of Distributis by Coop, see 2007 Antitrust Year in Review, at 87.
267. CoMCo, LAW AND POLICY ON COMPETI-rON 290-337 (2008), available at http://www.weko.admin.
ch/dokumentation/00157/index.html?langde#sprunginarke0_ 3; See also Press Release, ComCo, Weko llsst
Zusammenschluss von Fenaco und Steffen-Ris Holding AG unter Auflagen zu [Weko concentration of leaves
fenaco and Steffen-Ris AG, subject to compliance] (Mar. 13, 2008), available at HrrP:/AVWv.NEws-sERVICE.ADMIN.CH/NSBSUBSCRIBER/MESSAGE/DE] 17769.

268. ComCo Decision No. 32-0178 of July 7, 2008, available at http://www.weko.admin.ch/aktuell/00162/
index.html?lang=de. See also Press Release, ComCo, Weko beendet Untersuchung gegen Documed AG
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dominant position in the market by: (i) imposing unreasonable prices for the publication
of this information, and (ii) refusing to enter into contractual negotiations with competitors. Documed subsequently abandoned its practices during the course of the investigation. As a result, and having regard to Documed's cooperation with the investigation,
ComCo only imposed a fine of CHF$50,000 (approximately US$42,000).269
ComCo also initiated several investigations and procedures in 2008 that are still ongoing. For example, ComCo is investigating whether Swiss importers of French books into
Switzerland have a dominant position in the Swiss market and, if so, whether they are
270
imposing unreasonable prices on bookshops.
On November 12, 2008, the Secretariat of ComCo submitted an application to ComCo
to impose sanctions against Switzerland's largest telecommunications provider, Swisscom. 27 1 According to the Secretariat, Swisscom is abusing its allegedly dominant position
in the market for ADSL services by overpricing ADSL set-up services to the detriment of
competing internet service providers.
Finally, on January 31, 2008, ComCo started proceedings against several electric installation companies and trade associations for alleged bid rigging, which is one of ComCo's
enforcement priorities.2 72 ComCo initiated the investigation by conducting dawn raids on
the offices of various target companies.
XXX.
A.

Taiwan*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In October 2008, J.C. Tang, Chairman of Taiwan's Fair Trade Commission (the Commission), reported to the Legislature that the Commission has prepared a preliminary
draft bill to amend the Fair Trade Law. 273 The proposed amendments, among other
things, will aim to: (i) introduce a leniency program, (ii) exempt certain joint research and
[Comco completed investigation against Documed AG] (July 17, 2008), available at HTTP://WWW.NEWSSERVICE.ADMIN.cH/NSBSuBSC RIBER/MESSAGFDEI/2 0189.

269. Based on the November 25, 2008 noon exchange rate of CHF$1 = US$0.84.
270. PRESS RELEASE, CoMCo, DIE WEI-FBEWERBSKOMMISSION EROFFNET EINE UNTrERSUCHUNG
GEGEN DIE VERTREIBER FRANZOSISCHER BOCHER IN DER SCHWEIZ [THE COMPETITION COMvISSION
OPENED AN INVESTIGATION AGAINST TILE DISTRIBUTOR OF FRENCH-LANGUAGE BOOKS IN SWITZERLAND]

(MAR. 17, 2008), available at http://www.news-service.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/de/l7839t.
271. Press Release, ComCo, Antrag des Sekretariats in Untersuchung zugestellt [Request the Secretariat to
study delivered] (Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://www.news-service.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/de/
22795.
272. Press Release, ComCo, Weko er6ffnet Untersuchung betreffend Abreden im Bereich Elektroinstallationen [Comco opened investigation concerning agreements in the electrical field] (Feb. 1, 2008), available at
http://translate.google.com/translate? hl=en&sl=de&u=http://wvww.news-service.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/
message/de/l 7127&ei=JUOpSd7ZH4jBnQfRhZ3dDw&sa=X&oi=translate&resnum= 1&ct=result&prev=/
search% 3Fq%3Dhttp://www.news-service.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/de/I 712 7%26h% 3Den% 26
client% 3 Dfirefox-a%26rls% 3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26hs% 3D8ea.
* The contribution for Taiwan was written by John Lin of Jones Day.
273. The Fair Trade Law, first promulgated on February 4, 1991, became effective on February 4, 1992, and
was last amended on February 6, 2002, available at htrp://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/Fnews/FnewsContent.asp?
msgid=170&msgType=en&keyword=the+fair+trade+law. The Fair Trade Law is Taiwan's primary competition legislation addressing issues such as monopolistic conduct, combinations (mergers), and concerted actions (cartels).
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development activities from the prohibition against concerted actions, (iii) give the Commission search and seizure powers to better facilitate the investigation of concerted actions, and (iv) better differentiate the various types of violations and their respective
administrative liabilities to provide more transparency and predictability of enforcement
27
of the Fair Trade Law to the general public. 4
B.

MERGERS

In Taiwan, 2008 was an active year again for mergers and acquisitions. As of the end of
September 2008, the Commission had reviewed filings for a total of fifty-one mergers,
twenty-nine of which were allowed to proceed, two of which were prohibited, and the rest
of which either remain ongoing or were actually below the filing thresholds.
One notable decision, rendered in April 2008, involved the proposed merger between
Cashbox Partyworld Co., Ltd. (Cashbox) and Holiday Group Co., Ltd. (Holiday),275 the
two largest audio-visual singing (a.k.a. karaoke or KTV) businesses in Taiwan. The combined businesses were estimated to have a share of over fifty percent in the karaoke market
nationwide and an over ninety percent market share in Taipei, the nation's capital. Moreover, the market shares of remaining competitors would not individually exceed one percent. As a result, the Commission decided to prohibit the transaction on the grounds that
it would seriously lessen competition to the detriment of consumers and suppliers. The
Commission took this view even though the two companies had covenanted, as part of the
transaction, not to raise prices or close down operating locations for a period of time after
the merger.
C.

ANTICOMPETIT1E PRACTICES

The Commission rendered a total of ten administrative decisions against anticompetitive conduct and ninety decisions against unfair trading practices in the first nine months
of 2008.276
One of the more noteworthy cases was the Commission's investigation of two domestic
airlines, TransAsia Airways Corporation (TransAsia) and Uni Airways Corporation
(UniAir). 277 The two airlines entered into a "Revenue Pooling Agreement," pursuant to
which they agreed to: (i) allocate the number of seats provided per week on the Kaohsiung-to-Magong route and the Kaohsiung-to-Kinmen route, and (ii) distribute the revenue
in accordance with certain pre-agreed percentages. In reviewing this agreement, the
Commission took into account that TransAsia and UniAir are the only two airline companies providing flight services on the Kaohsiung-to-Magong and Kaohsiung-to-Kinmen
274. FAIR TRADE COMM'N, COMMISSION REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON POLIcy EXECUTION AND

BUDGETS FOR YEAR 2009 (Oct. 13, 2008), (on file with authors). The Commission has had several internal
discussions over the last few years regarding proposed amendments to the Fair Trade Law, but none of these
resulted in draft legislation being submitted to the legislature for consideration.
275. Commission Decision Gong-Chie-Tzi No.097002, availableat http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/
doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=781 &docid= 1737.
276. Statistics as of September 30, 2008 (published by the Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw/
EnglishWeb/20000101299912311136.htm.
277. Commission Disposition Gong-Chu-Tzi No. 097084, available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=283&docid=2489.
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routes, and that the two companies had failed to obtain prior approval from the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications. The Commission decided that the revenue pooling arrangement had resulted in a lessening of competition between 2003 and 2007 and
fined each of the companies NTS1,000,000 (approximately US $30,000).
XXXI.
A.

Ukraine*

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Antimonopoly Committee of the Ukraine (the AMC) has prepared draft legislation
to amend the thresholds for merger notification in the Law on Protection of Economic
Competition, 2001.278 The draft legislation proposes to quadruple the existing thresholds, which are among the lowest of any national competition laws, including the CIS
states. The draft legislation is currently being considered by the Cabinet of Ministers in
279
the Ukraine and must be passed by the Ukrainian Parliament before it comes into force.
B.

MERGERS

In October 2007, the AMC prohibited the acquisition by IBE Trade Corporation of
IBE Stirol (Ukraine). The AMC found that the proposed transaction would potentially
result in the monopolization of the market for mineral fertilizers. 280 On the other hand,
the AMC approved Bayer HealthCare's acquisition of the assets of Sagmel Group, a
leader in the manufacturing and distribution of over-the-counter medications in the
Ukraine, despite the significant market share held by the companies in the Ukraine (more
281
than 25 percent).
C.

ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES

In October 2008, the AMC fined four advertising companies UAH$605,000 (approximately US$92,000) for collusion in responding to a tender for the procurement of services
related to a national tourism advertising campaign. 282 Among other improprieties, the
companies agreed on the terms of their responses to the tender, ensuring that one com* The contribution for Ukraine was written by Denis Lysenko and Mariya Nizhnik of Vasil Kisil &
Partners.
278. Law No. 22-10 On Protection of Economic Competition ("Economic Competition Act"), 2001, art.
24, available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=2210-14.
279. See Anti-Monopoly Comm'n of Ukraine, Law on Amendments to Economic Competition Act-Draft,
available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/article?art -id=109212&cat id=45722. See also
Press Release, AMC, Antimonopoly Committee Proposes Improved Merger Control forCompanies (Aug,
11, 2008), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/controlluk/publish/article?art id=109241&catid=59331.
280. See Press Release, AMC, Antimonopoly Committee does not allow market monopolization of fertilizer
(Oct. 17, 2007), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/article?artid=
79993&cat id=641 10.
281. See Press Release, AMC, About the Decision and Order of the Antimonopoly Committee of the
Ukraine (AMC) (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/
article? artid= 107048&cat_id=91184.
282. See Press Release, AMC, Now on Sale of State Conspirator Wait "Clean" Antitrust Laws (Oct. 7,
2008), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/control/uk/publish/article?artid=l 10591&catid=91184.
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pany (Grand Print Ukraine, LLC) would win. 283 This is likely the first time that the
AMC has imposed a fine on companies for anticompetitive concerted actions in the context of a public procurement.
D.

ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION

In March 2008, the AMC fined Kernel-Trade LLC and SSE Suntrade UAH$60 million
(approximately US$9.1 million) per company for abusing their jointly-held dominant position in the Ukrainian sunflower oil market by imposing a non-justified increase in the
wholesale price of sunflower oil. 284 This was the largest fine imposed by the AMC since
its establishment. The AMC subsequently reduced the fines to UAH$1 million each (approximately US$151,000) after the two companies decreased their wholesale prices by
2
almost 15 percent. 8s

XXXII.
A.

United Kingdom*

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In July 2008, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading (the OFT) published its response to the
European Commission's White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules. 286 The OFT welcomed the Commission's proposal to adopt final decisions by

National Competition Authorities 287 (NCAs) or final judgments by review courts288 on
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty as irrebuttable proof of infringement in subsequent
civil antitrust damages cases relating to the same parties. The OFT considers that providing for such a binding effect is important for providing parties with increased certainty,
reducing litigation costs, and reducing burdens on the claimant.
B.

MERGERS

In September 2008, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the CAT) published its judgment on the joint appeals by BSkyB and Virgin against the Competition Commission's
report, and the subsequent final decision of the Secretary of State, on BSkyB's acquisition
283. Id.
284. See Press Release, AMC, Antimonopoly Committee has 120 MLN. Gm. Culprit high prices on oil
(Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/controlluk/publish/article?artid=103769&cat_
id=91184. See also Economic Competition Act, No. 12 (2001) (Ukr.), art. 24, available at http://zakon.rada.
gov.ua/cgi-binlaws/main.cgi?nreg=2210-14.
285. See Press Release, AMC, Antimonopoly Committee at 2 million. Gm. Increase the Treasury of the
State Oil (May 16, 2008), available at http://www.amc.gov.ua/amc/controlluk/publish/article?art id=1074
22&catid=91184.
* The contribution for United Kingdom was written by Stephen Kon, Dr. Gordon Christian, and Anna
Rampling of SJ Berwin LLP.
286. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMIISSION'S WHITE PAPER, DAMAGES
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF THE EC ANTITRUST RULES (2008), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white-paper-comments/oft-en.pdf.

287. Decision that has been accepted by the addressees (by virtue of their having refrained from appealing
the decision) or which has been upheld upon appeal. See id.
288. A judgment by a court competent to review the decisions of an EU National Competition Authority
under the laws of that authority's Member State. See id.
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of a 17.9% shareholding in ITV plc. 289 The CAT dismissed BSkyB's appeal, holding that
the Competition Commission was entitled to conclude that: (i) the acquisition created a
relevant merger situation, and (ii) this gave rise to a substantial lessening of competition.
The CAT also upheld the Competition Commission's order that BSkyB partially divest its
shareholding in ITV to a level below 7.5 percent. But the CAT did order the Competition Commission to reconsider its conclusion that the merger would have no adverse effect on media plurality.
C.

CARTELS

In June 2008, custodial sentences were imposed on three UK businessmen found guilty
290
of cartel conduct under the Enterprise Act affecting the global marine hose market.
These are the first prosecutions that have been brought in the UK under the criminal
"cartel offense" provisions of the Enterprise Act since the legislation came into force on
June 20, 2003. In addition, all three individuals were disqualified from serving as a company director for between five and seven years under the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986, and are subject to confiscation orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act
of 2002.
The OFT also concluded early resolution agreements with six companies under investigation for unlawful practices in relation to fixing the retail prices of tobacco products in
the UK, leading to total fines of£132.3 million (equivalent to US$197.5 million).291 The
use of this early resolution procedure is still a relatively novel one for the OFT, having
been applied in only three OFT investigations to date, but it is likely to become more
commonplace in the future.
Finally, the first ever representative action brought on behalf of consumers was settled
in January 2008. The action was for damages suffered as the result of an agreement to fix
the price of certain replica football uniforms during the period 2000 to 2001.292 Despite
the claim being settled in the early stages of proceedings, it nevertheless represented an
important step in the recognition of the potential for the development of collective
actions.
D. ANTICOMPETTIVE PRACTICES
The Competition Commission published its final report on the supply of groceries in

the U.K. on April 30, 2008.293 Whilst the OFT acknowledged that "in many important
respects, competition in the UK groceries industry is effective and delivers good outcomes
for consumers," it also identified several problems related to the strong market positions
289. British Sky Broad. Group plc and Virgin Media, Inc. v. Competition Commission et al., [2008] CAT
25, available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/fies/.Judg-revised-BSkyB-1095-irginInc
1096_290908.

pdf.
290. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, Three imprisoned in first OFT criminal prosecution for bid
rigging (June 11, 2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2008/72-08.
291. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT reaches early resolution agreements in tobacco case
(July 11, 2008), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2008/82-08.
292. See Press Release, JJB to make payments to consumers for replica football shirts (Jan. 9, 2008), available
at http://www.which.co.uk/news/2008/01/jjb-to-pay-fans-over-football-shirt-rip-off-128985.jsp.
293. Competition Comm'n, Market Investigation into The Supply of Groceries in the LK (Apr. 30, 2008),
available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep-pub/reports/2008/538grocery.htm.
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held by large grocery retailers: (i) the use of restrictive covenants and/or exclusivity arrangements to prevent entry by competitors, and (ii) the ability to transfer excessive risk
and unexpected costs to their suppliers. 294 The supermarkets concerned are now in
lengthy consultation with the Competition Commission over the remedies that it has proposed to address these issues.
Other industries in which parties are under investigation include construction (alleged
bid rigging), 295 energy (abuse of dominance in Scotland),96 and airports (restrictive prac2 97
tices related to common ownership of airports).
XXXIII.

A.

United States*

LEGISLATiVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

On September 8, 2008, the DOJ released its report on unilateral conduct under section
2 of the Sherman Act (the Report).29s The Report examines issues such as dominance,
general conduct standards, specific types of unilateral conduct, remedies, and international
cooperation and convergence in dealing with unilateral conduct. Key recommendations
in the Report include:
* adopting a market share safe harbor for companies with less than a fifty percent
market share, and an inference of monopoly power for market shares over sixty-six
299
percent;
* overruling the per se prohibition against tying; 300 and
* that exclusive dealing be per se legal if less than 30 percent of existing customers or
distribution is foreclosed.30i
B.

MERGERS

Several notable transactions were cleared in 2008 with minimal remedies or without any
conditions. Included among these was the DOJ's approval of Delta Air Lines' acquisition
of Northwest Airlines, clearing the way for the creation of the world's largest air car294. Id.
295. See Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT issues statement of objections against 112 construction
companies (Apr. 17, 2008), availableat http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2008/52-08.
296. See Information Note, OFGEM, OFGEM launches Competition Act investigation into Scottish Power
Limited and Scottish and Southern Energy plc (Apr. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/
PressRellDocumentsl/Ofgem% 2012.pdf.
297. COMPETITION COMMISSION, BAA Airports Market Investigation: Provisional Findings Report (Aug.
20, 2008), available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2007/airports/pdf/
provfind_report.pdf.
* The contribution for the United States was written by Fiona Schaeffer, Christopher Roberts, Jonathan
Sickler, Claire Webb, and Robin Cook of Weil, Gorshal & Manges, LLP, New York.
298. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION

2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. Interestingly, three of the four sitting FTC Commissioners jointly issued a statement disagreeing with much of the
Report shortly after it was issued; the FTC Chairman issued a separate statement. The FTC statements are
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm.
299. Id. at 24, 30.
300. Id. at 90.
301. Id. at 141.
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rier, 302 and the DOJ's clearance of Sirius Satellite Radio's acquisition of XM Satellite
303
Radio, representing a combination of the only two satellite radio service providers.
Other transactions were challenged. For example, the DOJ challenged the proposed
JBS S.A./National Beef Packing Company deal, which would combine two of the largest
30
four U.S. beef packers. 4
In the Whole Foods case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed a lower
court decision denying the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction to block Whole
Foods' acquisition of the Wild Oats grocery chain. 305 The D.C. Circuit held that the
lower court had erred by defining the relevant market too broadly. The Court placed
significant weight on pricing and other economic data, as well as the companies' internal
documents and studies, to show that there was a unique market for premium, natural, and
organic supermarkets.
C.

CARTELS

The Antitrust Division of the DOJ obtained criminal plea agreements in several major
cartel investigations, including large fines for corporations and fines and prison sentences
for culpable executives. In November 2008, for example, the Division announced guilty
pleas by three manufacturers of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels, who agreed to pay a
306
total of US$585 million for conspiring to fix LCD panel prices over a five-year period.
The largest of these fines (US$400 million), imposed on LG Display Co., Ltd. is the
second-largest criminal fine ever imposed by the Division. 30 7 The Division's investigation
into a conspiracy to fix rates for international air cargo shipments, which began in 2007 in
coordination with numerous foreign enforcement agencies, led to guilty pleas by several
airlines and individual executives. 308 The Division also obtained guilty pleas from partici309
pants (including individuals) in the marine hose cartel.
In November 2007, a district court dismissed criminal indictments against Stolt-Nielsen S.A. and two company executives on the grounds that the amnesty agreement between
302. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Statement of the Department ofJustice's Antitrust Division On Its
Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Merger of Delta Air Lines Inc. and Northwest Airline Corporation
(Oct. 29, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2008/238849.htm.
303. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its
Decision to Close Its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holding Inc.'s Merger With Sirius Satellite Radio
Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2008/231467.htm.
304. United States v. JBS S.A., No. 08 Civ. 5992 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f238300/238388.htm. As of this writing, the litigation is ongoing.
305. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
306. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, LG, Sharp, Chunghwa agree to plead guilty, pay total of US$585
million in fines for participating in LCD price-fixing conspiracies (Nov. 12, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2008/239349.htm.
307. Fines were also imposed on Sharp Corp. (US$120 million) and Chunghwa (US$65 million).
308. Fines have been imposed on British Airways plc (US$300 million), Qantas Airways Limited (USS61
million), Japan Airlines (US$110 million), SAS Cargo Group A/S (US$52 million), Cathay Pacific Airways
Limited (US$60 million), Martinair Holland N.V. (US$42 million), and Air France-KLM (US$350 million).
Individual employees of British Airways, Qantas, and SAS have also pleaded guilty and agreed to penalties
including fines and jail time.
309. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Italian marine hose manufacturer and marine hose executives agree
to plead guilty to participating in worldwide bid-rigging conspiracy (July 28, 2008), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2008/235515 .htm.
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31 0
In light of the district
Stolt and the Antitrust Division barred any criminal prosecution.
court's dismissal of the indictments, the Division announced that it was dropping its
case. 3 11 This brought to an end the five-year battle between the Antitrust Division and
Stolt-Nielsen over the terms of the amnesty agreement, which commenced when the Division took the extraordinary step in 2003 of attempting to revoke Stolt's amnesty for
alleged misrepresentation.

D.

MONOPOLIZATION

There were several significant decisions under section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolization or attempt to monopolize. Of particular note was the D.C. Circuit Court of
2
Appeal's decision in Rambus Inc. v. FTC,31 where it held that the defendant's failure to
disclose the ownership of a patent to a standard-setting organization of which the defendant was a member did not cause competitive harm, even though this allowed the defendant to acquire monopoly power over four technologies. The Court found that there was
not sufficient evidence that the standard-setting body would not have used the defendant's
patent but for the deception, and that there was thus no basis to impose antitrust liability.
The Court left open the question of whether deception could constitute monopolization
when there is a proven anticompetitive effect.

XXXIV.

A.

Vietnam*

INTRODUCTION

The Law on Competition was passed on December 3, 2004 and took effect on July 1,
2005. 313 The law is comprehensive and addresses economic concentrations and unfair
practices, as well as practices in restraint of competition. The key enforcement bodies are
the Competition Council, which is responsible for adjudicating complaints of restrictive
practices, and the Vietnam Competition Administration Department (VCAD), which is
the investigatory branch with responsibility for the review of mergers, exemption applications, and the sanctioning of acts that are considered unfair competition.
In addition to the law itself, detailed implementation guidelines have been produced
dealing with issues relating to the Competition Council and providing further details on
the provisions of the Competition Act.
B.

CAPACrrY BUILDING/ADvocAcY

Until recently, it appeared that the primary focus of VCAD was on capacity building,
advocacy, and consulting activities designed to increase awareness of competition law
within Vietnam. VCAD and the Ministry of Industry and Trade have received considera310. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department will not appeal Stolt-Nielsen decision (Dec.
2

21, 2007), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/ 28788.htm.
311. Id.
312. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
* The contribution for Vietnam was written by David Fruitman of DFDL Mekong.
313. ORDER No. 23/2004/L - CTN OF DECEMBER 14, 2004 THE PROMULGATION OF LAW, available at
http://www.adb.org/documents/others/ogc-toolkits/competition-law/documents/vn-order_23_2004.pdf.

SUMMER 2009

288

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

ble international support for capacity-building activities. For example, a Letter of Intent
3
relating to capacity building was signed with the Netherlands in 2008. 14
On June 4, 2008, VCAD signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Health
Inspectors to enhance enforcement of competition law in the health sector in Hanoi. The
315
main terms of the MOU are available on VCAD's web site.
VCAD has also recently been involved in "outreach" seminars dealing with issues re36
lated to control of economic concentrations in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. 1
VCAD faces considerable difficulties in these efforts as Vietnam has not fully transitioned to a market economy and government agencies and industry groups still frequently
take measures to protect against "unhealthy competition" and promote co-operative activities to support specific industrial sectors or the economy as a whole. Earlier this year, for
example, the Vietnam Banking Association, the State Bank of Vietnam, and even the Ministry of Industry and Trade were all involved in activities to regulate interest rates and
317
promote programs that raised competition law concerns.

C.

INVES-IGATIONS

While VCAD has received competition complaints, it has provided little information
with respect to investigations or remedies either on its website or in response to enquiries.
Of particular interest, however, is the opening of an investigation into the actions of sixteen insurance companies, after they raised car insurance premiums. 319 Additionally, it is
possible that VCAD has opened an investigation into a reported agreement by members
of the Vietnam Steel Association to fix prices. This has been widely reported in Vietnamrelated news services, 319 although no information has been provided on VCAD's website
as of the date of writing and VCAD declined to provide any information with respect to
0
this matter other than to confirm that it was collecting information.32

314. See Press Release, Vietnam Competition Administration Department, The Ministry of Industry and
Trade of Vietnam and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands Signing of Letter of Intent on
Cooperation on Capacity Building in The Field of Competition Law (Mar. 17, 2008), availableat http://www.
qlct.gov.vn/Web/Content.aspx?distid=676&lang=en-US.
315. See Press Release, Vietnam Competition Administration Department, VCAD and Health Inspectors
signing MOU on cooperation in enforcement of competition law in health sector (Sept. 17, 2008), availableat
http://www.qlct.gov.vn/Web/Content.aspx?distd=970&lang=en-US.
316. See Press Release, Vietnam Competition Administration Department, Seminar "Economic concentration - practices in Vietnam and international experience" in Hochiminh city (Nov. 6, 2008), availableat http:/
/www.qlct.gov.vn/Web/Content.aspx?distid=l 245&lang=en-US.
317. See Press Release, VietNamNet Bridge, Banks Not Allowed to Offer Promotion Programmes (Apr. 28,
2008), available at http://english.viemamnet.vn/biz/2008/04/780558/.
318. See Press Release, Global Competition Review, Vietnam investigates insurers (Dec. 1, 2008), availableat
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/l 2115/Vietnam-investigates-insurers.
319. See Press Release, Thanhnien News, Steel Price Fix under Antitrust Probe (Oct. 20, 2008), availableat
http://www.thanhniennews.com/business/?catid=2&newsid=42994.
320. It is possible that, despite the implication of the English language reports, VCAD has not yet actually
begun a preliminary investigation. For example, it appears that the Vietnamese-language Vietnam Economic
Times reported that VCAD is only weighing the option of opening an investigation.
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